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I.

INTRODUCTION: AN ARGUMENT FOR INTERNET ACCESS
AMIDST CYBERSPACE PRIVATIZATION

In the once wild and untamed world of cyberspace, fences are being put up
all over the place. Using a variety of theories based in property, contract, tort,
and criminal law, lawyers are helping make sure that public interests give way to
private, proprietary concerns.! The concern driving much of this defensive,
circling-the-wagons legal activity is the preservation of commercial advantage. A
consequence of the enclosing of cyberspace 2-the erection of boundaries and the
delimitation of borders-is that some persons are excluded from portions of
cyberspace where they were previously free to roam.
This Article's point of departure is a concern about the implications of
Internet exclusion. Historically, the assertion of the right to exclude has been a
powerful tool of the Anglo-American private property owner, a right that is at
3
the very core of what it means for an individual to hold private property.
Simultaneously, however, the right to exclude has constituted a means to assert
economic and social privilege, such as laws that systematically kept the
descendants of African slaves or Jewish immigrants-to cite but two groups of
excluded persons-from gaining access to resources enjoyed by the descendants
of Christian European settlers.4 One reason that the increased propertization of
cyberspace need concern us, therefore, is that a property owner's right to
exclude others has in our nation's history served to promote discrimination and
inequality as much as it has protected individual rights. And, as this article
suggests, one way to guard against increased exclusion on the Internet is to
articulate a right of public accommodation in cyberspace.
For the average Internet user, this proposition may, at first glance, seem
anything but intuitive. That is, with its endless banner ads and pop-up screens
imploring us to buy this or that, offering a special one-time offer if only the user
1. Dan Hunter, for example, has pointed to "the recent rise of the 'trespass to chattels' action,
the extension of criminal liability to competitors' legitimate investigation of rivals' websites, and the
increasing importance of website 'Terms of Use,"' and a number of other online developments. Dan
Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 446
(2003).
2. James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Constructionof the Public Domain, 66
J.L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 33,34 (2003).

3. See, e.g., Uston v. Airport Casino, Inc., 564 F.2d 1216, 1217 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding no
common law duty of casino owner to provide would-be gambler with access to casino owner's facility).
4. For example, racially or religiously restrictive covenants of sale are commonly used to exclude
certain persons. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948) (holding that neighborhood's
covenant restricting owner's sale of home to African Americans violated Fourteenth Amendment).
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takes just a minute and acts now, the increasingly commercialized Internet seems
to be all about trying to include-or to invite a purchase-rather than to exclude.
But on examination, it is easy to identify examples in different areas of Internet
use in which Internet exclusion is a central aspect of the legal battle over
Internet control.
The most celebrated such example is, of course, the United States
government's case against the Microsoft Corporation, in which the government
successfully prosecuted the computer giant on antitrust grounds for tying its
browser software to its Windows Operating System. 5 Doctrinally, the case is
about antitrust law and not the common law of property. Nonetheless, for my
purposes it merits noting that, fundamentally, Microsoft's claim was about its
entitlement to assert its proprietary interest, which had the effect of excluding
others.
In fact, many sites deliberately discriminate as to access. The banner ads or
pop-up ads that I see are dictated by my other choices on-line-by the purchases
I make or the other sites I visit.6 To the extent that those choices reflect my
relatively privileged status as a highly educated white male in this society, such
practices constitute a form of discriminatory exclusion, since someone without
my demographic profile gets directed elsewhere. That person may never have
the opportunity to know of, much less apply for, credit cards or insurance
services or mortgage financing-or any number of other goods and services-on
the terms and conditions I might receive.
Because exclusion is deeply tied to discrimination in our society, such
exclusion should concern us. Such practices raise an important question, namely:
should Internet users be guaranteed some level of access to its contents, to the
goods and services it provides, and to the facility it constitutes? This article
argues that such a right of access needs to be recognized and that, furthermore, a
key tool to facilitate this end is the law of public accommodation.
Internet exclusion is a real and troubling phenomenon. Suppose, for
instance, that you were blind, and that as a result of your disability, you could
not access the Internet, with all of its wealth of information, goods, and services,
without special software. Or suppose that you wanted to explore the contents of
a major news source, but could not do so without first providing your income
information and agreeing to have your personal Internet browsing habits
tracked-presumably for future commercial solicitations. These examples
reflect actual exclusion of some persons (the blind and those unwilling to
sacrifice privacy in exchange for Internet access) from the Internet. 7 This article
advances the view that such exclusion runs counter to long-established values

5. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 215 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002).
6. Vendors are, unsurprisingly, keen to preserve their right to use e-technologies to identify their
ideal customers and have, as a result, made various self-regulatory proposals. See Network Advertising
Initiative, http://www.networkadvertising.org (establishing privacy policy for Internet advertisers) (last
visited August 26, 2003).
7. See infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the exclusion of blind persons
and infra note 8 and accompanying text for a discussion of the news source example.
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embedded in our legal tradition that support openness and access for entities
that, like the Internet, hold themselves out to do business with the public.
Following this introduction, Part II makes the case that public
accommodation law is an appropriate legal vehicle to establish a right of Internet
access. Part III begins with a brief review of the current state of public
accommodation law followed by a consideration, in light of that review, of some
of the possible limitations of public accommodation principles for regulating the
Internet. I will then identify which aspects of the Internet should be classified as
places of public accommodation. In this connection, I will examine debates
about the nature and scope of public accommodation principles as they apply to
persons with disabilities-the area in which the most vigorous debates about
public accommodation are occurring.
The discussion will not, however, be limited to the disabilities rights context.
As noted above, the concern about discrimination in cyberspace extends not
only to disadvantages suffered by the disabled. On the contrary, the medium
uniformly discriminates on the basis of income, 8 and, as the article will explore,
there is every reason to suppose that it actively discriminates on other bases as
well. Part III will therefore conclude by comparing questions of Internet access
to the justifications for access to goods and services in other areas of the law.
Part IV will further develop an analytical justification for regulating the
Internet by means of public accommodation law. To this end, Part IV will begin
with a challenge to the increasing dominance of the private contract model for
Internet governance. Following the lead of Thomas Grey's seminal article on
the "disintegration" of property, 9 I suggest that recent property law scholarship
provides useful frameworks for thinking about the questions that will drive this
debate, namely how to secure public access and rights to the Internet, while also
respecting concerns about control and private ownership of the Internet's
complicated physical infrastructure. Part IV then explores justifications for the
argument in modern property theory, and advocates a legislative effort explicitly
to include Internet access in federal and state accommodation law.
II. FROM CYBERSPACE TO CYBERPLACE: WHY PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION LAW?

A notable aspect in the development of the Internet' is the vocabulary it
8. See CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 57-61 (Princeton 2001). See also infra notes 59-60 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the digital divide.
9. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegrationof Property, in 22 NOMOS XXII 69 (J. Roland Pennock &
John W. Chapman, eds. 1980). As Grey famously noted, in words of precise relevance to the
argument put forward here, "most property in a modern capitalist economy is intangible." Id. at 70.
The reach--one might say the specter-of this article continues to trouble property scholars. See, e.g.,
Peter S. Menell & John P. Dwyer, Reunifying Property, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 599, 600 (2002) (noting
numerous scholars have questioned Grey's arguments).
10. The Internet is, of course, a much larger and more comprehensive entity than is suggested by
the activities I have just described, most of which relate to the most commonly-used feature of the
Internet, namely the World Wide Web, which is, in fact, "a set of protocols for displaying hyperlinked
documents linked across the Internet." LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 41 (2001). See also
ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: How THE INTERNET IS PUTTING INDIVIDUALS
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has generated. Gertrude Stein famously said of Oakland, California, that
"[t]here is no there there.""1 Similarly, at first glance it may appear as if there is
no "there there" with the Internet. It is, perhaps more than anything else,
characterized by its decentralization: its riches mined from millions of computer
terminals, which gather information and transmit it across phone lines and cables
that literally span continents, cross oceans, and move across outer space,
undetected by the naked eye. And if decentralization correctly describes the
Internet's defining physical aspect, the variety and diversity of uses to which this
resource can be put is similarly dizzying: many millions of people access widely
divergent kinds of information and documents, play games, and "chat" online
with their friends and total strangers. They access this information and take
advantage of the Internet's opportunities and resources via different servers,
each of which connects to Internet service providers ("ISPs") and, in turn, search
engines owned by widely divergent individuals, corporations, and governments.
Nonetheless, despite the absence of a centralized location, we continue to
describe the Internet as if there is a "there" there. That is, we describe the
Internet as if it is-or perhaps is a multitude of-places. We try and find things
in cyberspace; if I want to chat with friends and family, I may enter a chat room.
Information is collected and in turn accessible on Internet sites. Real property
metaphors are commonly used to describe cyber-activity, including turf, 12 the
construction offirewalls,13 and references to the "building" of sites. 14 Lawrence
Lessig, perhaps the leading legal analyst of cyberspace, relies upon the propertybased metaphor of the "architecture"of the Internet to advance his most recent
argument about the proper distribution of Internet ownership rights. 15 Like
16
many Internet analysts, Lessig refers frequently to "communities" of users.
Scholars of cyberlaw evince a fondness for a cyber-pun on a place name, and
refer to the Internet with the whimsical label "Cyberia."' 17 One commentator
worries about "forces internal and external to cyberspace [that] are taming the
electronic frontier by establishing the first legal footpaths for 'our'

IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW 14-15 (1999) (pointing to increasing difficulty of

defining Internet).
11. BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 627 (Justin Kaplan, ed., 16th ed. 1992) (emphasis
added) (quoting GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1937)).

12.
(1994).
13.
14.
15.

I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime For "Cyberspace," 55 U. PITr. L. REV. 993, 994
LESSIG, supra note 10, at 172 (emphasis added).

Id. at 125 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., id. at 120 (emphasis added) (using architectural metaphor to describe differences

between real space and cyberspace). See also Lessig's unfortunate neologism (at least to my ears), by

which he transforms the noun architecture into the verb "to architect." Id. at 139; Margaret Jane
Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & COM. 509, 526 (1996) (asserting commitment to an
open network provides economic incentives for compromises) (emphasis added).
16. LESSIG, supranote 10, at 162 (emphasis added).
17. Hardy, supra note 12, at 994. See also Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, No Regulation,
Government Regulation, or Self-regulation:Social Enforcement or Social Contractingfor Governance
in Cyberspace, 6 CORNELL J. OF L. AND PUB. POL'Y 475 (1997)
"cyberians" descriptions of Internet's conceptual location).

(referring to "cyberia" and
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convenience." 18 And if we want to share information about ourselves or our
endeavors with the computer-connected world, we do so by means of an
electronically transmitted place, the home page. 9
In other words, the default metaphor set used to describe the Internet does
so as if it is a-or as if it is characterized by-physical location. 20 Indeed, the
fence-building and boundary-drawing that characterize today's Internet suggest
that the undefined realm that was once "cyberspace" has rapidly been colonized
and defined so that it is appropriate to begin to speak instead of "cyberplace," a
neologism that implies a more fixed notion of property and property ownership.
One might argue that not too much should be made of the phenomenon of
property metaphor in the electronic world-language often uses metaphor when
faced with new technology for which no established vocabulary exists. 21 Yet, in
response, it need be said that when faced with new technology, language may
also be chosen that reflects what seems to users to be the most reasonable way of
18. Gibbons, supranote 17, at 478 (emphasis added).
19. Cf id. (describing metaphorical use of 'cyberia' and its inhabitants, 'cyberians'); see also
Trotter Hardy, The Ancient Doctrine of Trespass to Web Sites, 1996 J. ONLINE L., Oct. 1996, available
at LEXIS, Academic Library ("Perhaps it is no accident that people are so fond of the term 'home
page' it invokes strong emotional feelings. For that matter, anyone who has experienced a physical
break-in of their home understands in a way that others cannot just how strong is the emotional sense
of insecurity and helplessness that results.").
20. Cf Hardy, supra note 19, at 1 (similarly observing real place metaphors used to describe
cyberspace). A notable aspect of the cyber-experience is, of course, its double-ness. That is, one's
spatial experience of cyberspace use is both "there" and "here" at once. Lessig memorably captures
this double-ness in the opening words of one of his many pleas for keeping cyberspace open and
uncontrolled instead of highly regulated:
Cyberspace is a place. People live there. They experience all the sorts of things that they
experience in real space, there. For some, they experience more. They experience this not
as isolated individuals, playing some high tech computer game; they experience it in groups,
in communities, among strangers, among people they come to know, and sometimes like.
While they are in that place, cyberspace, they are also here. They are at a terminal screen,
eating chips, ignoring the phone. They are downstairs on the computer, late at night, while
their husbands are asleep. They are at work, or at cyber cafes, or in a computer lab. They
live this life there, while here. And then at some point in the day, they jack out, and are only
here. They step up from the machine, in a bit of a daze; they turn around. They have
returned.
Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1403 (1996).
21. See Gibbons, supranote 17, at 486 (adopting view that, despite prevalence of spatial and, one
might add, geographic vocabulary, the appropriate metaphor to describe cyberspace is biological).
Gibbons claims:
Culturally, socially, religiously, and economically diverse communities come together so that
"the whole system is propagating and evolving .... Cyberspace [is] a social petri dish, the
[Intern]et [is] the agar medium, and virtual communities, in all their diversity, [are] the
colonies of microorganisms that grow in petri dishes.
Each of the colonies of a
microorganism-the communities on the [Intern]et-is a social experiment that nobody
planned but that is happening nevertheless.
Id. (quoting Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community- Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier6
(1993)). See also Internet Business Network, Customer Intimacy: How Websites Learn and What They
Have to Teach, www.interbiznet.com/custint/map.html (last visited Jul. 16, 2002) (Site no longer
available).
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conceptualizing that technology. And that language carries with it a pre-existing
set of values and norms. On occasion, organic metaphors have also been used to
describe cyberspace,2 2 but organic metaphors have not taken hold as the default
The fact that physical metaphor-it might be called the
metaphor set.
"metaphor of place"-has instead taken hold as the default metaphor set in
cyberspace requires our attention. My premise here, then, is that the language
we have chosen to describe the Internet reveals not only how we conceptualize
the Internet, but also, and more importantly, how we decide the legal rules and
standards that we want to govern it.
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson famously examined the power of
metaphor as a tool that both orders and creates reality. 23 Dan Hunter, applying
Lakoff's theories to cyberspace regulation, laments what he concludes is the
"default principle of exclusion" now operating in cyberspace.2 4 Somewhat
wistfully, Hunter even proposes supplanting the "Cyberspace as Place"
metaphor "with another one which leads to more palatable public policy
results. ' 25 For Hunter, a more palatable public policy would allow for maximum
Internet access in the form of an unrestricted (or less restricted) e-commons.
Ultimately, however, Hunter rejects a non-spatial metaphor set as unrealistic,
recognizing that it is hard to imagine an alternative. 2 6 Hunter's analysis thus
underscores the significance of the metaphor choice we have chosen for
cyberspace.
His preference for cyber-regulation, given a physicalized
conception, would be to see the Internet regulated as a commons, as a pooled
resource, rather than by application of private property principles like the law of
public accommodation. 27 The argument that follows is, by contrast, less hopeful
than Hunter that we can turn back the clock to break down e-fences and open up
cyber-resources. That is, unlike Hunter, this article accepts that the Cyberspace
Enclosure Movement is with us to stay. 28 Like Hunter, however, it aims to
insure openness and access, and to do so by an established property law
principle.

22. See Gibbons, supra note 17, at 486 (arguing that evolution of Internet makes biological
metaphors appropriate to describe cyberspace); see also Arthur J. Cockfield, Designing Tax Policy for
the Digital Biosphere: How the Internet is Changing Tax Laws, 34 CONN. L. REV. 333, 356-59 (2002)
(analyzing Internet as "man-made biosphere").
23. See, e.g., GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE By 3-4 (1980)
(presenting theory that metaphor is not peripheral, but fundamental to conceptualization and
understanding language); see also GEORGE LAKOFF AND MARK TURNER, MORE THAN COOL
REASON: A FIELD GUIDE TO POETIC METAPHOR xii (Univ. of Chicago, 1989) (analyzing role of
metaphor in poetry by addressing questions of rhetoric, meaning, and reasoning).
24. Hunter, supra note 1, at 511.
25. Id. at 514.
26. Id. at 465-72 (following Lakoff, Hunter distinguishes between "cognitive" and other
metaphor, such as literary metaphor, for example. In his analysis, cognitive metaphors are those by
which we order and create reality).
27. Id. at 507-14.

28. Id. at 506-7.
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A. Public Accommodation and Property Law
The larger concern of this article is to enter into the debate over the legal
consequences of conceiving cyberspace as a physical location or series of
locations. To this end, I argue for a fully integrated, holistic view of new
information technologies, one that necessarily (because of the nature of the
activity) must blur the lines between public and private. This is not to say that
appropriate lines cannot be drawn, that boundaries cannot be defined. It is to
propose, instead, that the Internet's boundaries must be understood as
situational and not as fixed, physically permanent ones. 29 In a different context,
the Italian architect and urban theorist Aldo Rossi wrote of the city as follows:
[I]t must be understood that the city represents the progress of human
reason, is a human creation par excellence; and this statement has
meaning only when the fundamental point is emphasized that the city
and every urban artifact are by nature collective. I am often asked why
only historians give us a complete picture of the city. I believe the
answer is that historians are concerned with the urban artifact in its
30
totality.
By extension, Rossi's observations about the collective nature of cities, and his
appeal to examine them in their totality, applies equally to the way we need to
begin as members of a larger society charged with crafting and applying its laws,
to think of cyberspace: as an extension of the total artifact that is our society and
its laws. And if one ventures to think broadly and creatively about this issue,
there are bases in decided case law for so conceptualizing the law of public
accommodation.
More specifically then, this article examines one aspect of the
conceptualization of cyberspace in physical property terms, namely whether the
Internet should be understood to be a place of public accommodation. By
"public accommodation," I refer to that major exception to the right to
exclude-that proverbial "biggest stick" in the bundle of sticks that constitutes
the rights and obligations of property ownership. That is, I understand the term
public accommodation to refer to the legal obligation of a private business or

29. What I have in mind here is not far from the "muddy" cyberspace entitlements advocated by
Dan Burk, although it need be said that his conception appears to me to be a more free-wheeling,
Wild West model than what I have in mind. See Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 164 (1999) (arguing that complex rules regulating Internet will lead parties
using Internet to enter into informal agreements and to resort to self-help). It bears emphasizing,
too-an important, if rather obvious point-that the implications of new technologies are transforming
the way we conceive of business relations in many ways. See, e.g., Jennifer E. Doty, Note, The Effects
of Electronic Commerce on the TraditionalShopping Center Lease, 6 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 85, 9296 (1999) (stating that electronic commerce can cause lease breaches by vendors with operations in
shopping centers because traditional shopping center leases typically contain geographic covenants not
to compete); Barbara Spillman Schweiger, Note, The Path of E-law: Liberty, Property, And
Democracy From The Colonies to The Republic of Cyberia, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 223,
225 (1998) (discussing legislative response to industrialism outdated, laissez-faire economic theory as
inadequate and addressing new legislative response to arrival of information age).
30. ALDO Rossi, THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE CITY 57 (Diane Ghirardo & Joan Ockman trans.,
Oppositions Books 1982).
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service to provide the public with reasonable access to its business or service
despite the private character of its operation. My aim is not only to advance the
view that the Internet is a place of accommodation but also to suggest that we
would do well to listen to metaphor and, because property metaphor is so widely
used to describe Internet activity, to rely more heavily than we have on property
law to guide the regulation of cyberspace. In so doing, I come down firmly on
the side of those who believe that many of the issues raised by the legal
regulation of cyberspace are not terribly different from those raised by the
earlier regulation of other kinds of property. 31 Therefore, I reject the views of
the cyber-exceptionalists, those who assert the novelty of and therefore the
32
virgin regulatory universe that they claim is the Internet.
This is more than an academic question. On the contrary, it arises out of
real struggles over Internet use that have occurred in the past and are likely to
occur again in the future. Consider, for instance, a lawsuit brought in federal
court against an ISP on the grounds that the ISP breached its customer
agreement with and violated plaintiff's public accommodation rights under Title
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it failed to prevent chat room participants
33
from engaging in language that degraded and insulted plaintiffs religion.
Plaintiff, a Muslim, complained to defendant AOL about anti-Muslim postings in
a chat room available on defendant's service, but to no avail. With respect to the
Title II claim, the Court found that "'places of public accommodation' are
limited to actual, physical places and structures, and thus cannot include chat
rooms, which are not actual physical facilities but instead are virtual forums for
' 34
communication provided by AOL to its members.
Or consider a lawsuit brought in a different federal court against an airline
on the grounds that its website's "'virtual ticket counters' are inaccessible to the
blind. ' 35 A non-profit group representing the disabled and one of its members
31. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy,65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1239-50 (1998)
(concluding transitional legal tools can resolve regulatory problems associated with Internet); Joseph
H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1148 (2000) (noting that information
technology raises few novel legal issues).
32. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-the Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1379 (1996) (arguing that cyberspace forms new boundary requiring its own laws
and legal institutions separate from existing doctrines). But see Arthur J. Cockfield, Transforming the
Internet into a Taxable Forum:A Case Study in E-Commerce Taxation, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1171, 1202-06
(2002) (agreeing in part with Johnson and Post, but arguing they overstate case that Internet cannot be
effectively regulated). See also generally Lawrence Lessig & Paul Resnick, Zoning Speech on the
Internet: A Legal and Technical Model, 98 MICH L. REV. 395, 395-96 (1999) (concluding 'real space'
laws do not apply to cyberspace within context of free speech).
33. Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 545 (E.D. Va. 2003).
34. Id. at 541 (concluding Title 1I's list of public accommodations only includes physical

structures).
35. Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2002)
(arguing that Title II of Americans with Disabilities Act mandated that airline's website be accessible
to blind). See also Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Am. Online, Inc., No. 99CV12303EFH (D. Mass., filed
Nov. 4, 1999) (asserting Internet service provider's browser and services did not comply with Title III
of ADA); Blind Group Sues AOL, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST 965, col. 3 (Dec. 31, 1999).
The form of the complaint is available at 1 AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: PRACTICE AND
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sued Southwest Airlines under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
("ADA"), 36 claiming that Southwest discriminated against the blind because its
system neither removed barriers to communication nor provided satisfactory
auxiliary aids and services to make its website accessible to sight-impaired
persons.

37

Concluding that "the Internet website, southwest.com, does not exist in any
particular geographical location" and that, therefore, "Plaintiffs are unable to
demonstrate that Southwest's website impedes their access to a specific, physical,
concrete space such as a particular airline ticket counter or travel agency," the
with prejudice for failing to state a claim
Court dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint
38
upon which relief could be granted.
Such highly location-bound conceptions of public accommodation law are
both wrong-headed and out of step with the historical development and purposes
of public accommodation law. In his thorough review of the modern law of
public accommodation, Joseph Singer identifies a notion that today would be
characterized as a public accommodation principle. The concept isolated by
Singer, however, is very different from the "common law" principles now handed
down as black letter law in our law schools. Specifically, the current standard
narrative about the common law of public accommodation provides that,
two classes of persons
historically, the right to exclude was absolute, except ' for
39
"
"innkeepers.
and
carriers"
"common
specifically
only,
Singer, however, effectively questions the authenticity of today's standard

COMPLIANCE MANUAL 6:551 (1994 & Supp. 2000). See also Peter David Blanck, Leonard A. Sandier,
ADA Title III and the Internet: Technology and Civil Rights, MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L.
REP. Sept./Oct. 2000, at 855 (reporting National Federation lawsuit eventually settled and finding case
has spawned several treatments in law reviews, limited to question if Internet is place of public
accommodation with respect to disabilities). See also generally Jonathan Bick, Americans with
DisabilitiesAct and the Internet, 10 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 205, 211-17 (2000) (proposing language of
Act should be broadly construed to effectuate goal of eliminating discrimination against disabled);
Paul Taylor, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Internet, 7 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 26, 40
(2000) (concluding economic effects of applying ADA to Internet should be carefully evaluated);
Dana Whitehead McKee & Deborah T. Fleischaker, ADA and the Internet: Must Websites be
Accessible to the Disabled?, 33 MD. B.J. 34, 36 (2000) (concluding that Internet and Websites should
be viewed as public accommodations under ADA Title III); Justin D. Petruzzelli, Note, Adjust Your
Font Size: Websites Are Public Accommodations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 53
RUTGERS L. REV. 1063, 1067 (2001) (claiming websites must be recognized as place of public
accommodation under Title III to satisfy general mandate of ADA); L. Kim Tan, Pact Leads Group to
Drop Suit vs. AOL, BOSTON HERALD, July 27, 2000, at 29 (reporting that National Federation of the
Blind withdrew suit against AOL because AOL planned to release software which made Internet
accessible to blind); Ritchenya A. Shepard, Net Rights for the Disabled? AOL Suit By Blind Could
Nov. 22, 1999, at B8 (discussing potential impact on
Impact Online Firms - and Others, NAT'L L.J.,
making Internet accessible to the substantial number of blind computer users).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1995 & Supp. 2003).
37. Access Now, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1314.
38. Id. at 1321.
39. See, e.g., Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club Inc., 72 N.E.2d 697, 698 (N.Y. 1947)
(holding that race track operator had absolute right to exclude, so long as he did not exclude on
grounds of race, creed, color, or national origin).
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narrative account. His analysis demonstrates that the alleged common law
categories are not as fixed as recent generations of U.S. law students have been
led to believe. Instead, he suggests, today's standard narrative is likely a postCivil War creation, one designed to reinforce the racially-based categories and
exclusions of Jim Crow. Thus, Singer identifies a pre-Civil War norm, one that,
he shows, has in some form held sway in some jurisdictions since the Civil Warthat those who engage in business with the public possess a duty to serve all who
come to use or enjoy their service. Singer's analysis thus reinforces the
usefulness of clarifying principles of Internet access in public accommodation
terms inasmuch as cyberspace unquestionably provides services to the public.
His discussion further reveals the extent to which the modern "common law" of
public accommodation developed in order to cement the emerging and legallyenforced racial caste system that developed following the Civil War.
Simultaneously, refinements in the law of public accommodation sought to
provide for some racially integrated uses of private property, but also to limit
and control the right of access. 40 Singer's examination of the historical legal
record explores:
the fact that the postbellum laws clearly enshrined a right of access to
places of public accommodation [for both whites and blacks] and that,
in many Northern states and some Southern states, this declaration had
the effect of promoting both access and integration at least some of the
time. At the same time, this fact generated a backlash. Other courts
reacted to the newly asserted rights of access by rejecting the idea that
access implied integration and by strictly
limiting the categories of
41
businesses subject to the duty to serve.
This, he further indicates, reveals something unexpected about the common law
exceptions to the sacrosanct right to exclude that has been learned and
perpetuated by generations of law students and lawyers, namely the exceptions
for common carriers and innkeepers. 42 These exceptions may actually represent
a post-Civil War narrowing of an earlier common law requirement of a duty to
43
serve when an entity opened itself up to the public.
40. Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property,

90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283, 1348 (1996) (citing role of public accommodation laws as battleground in
post-Civil War reconstruction era and beyond).
41. Id. at 1382-83 (emphasis added). The ideological tug-of-war Singer describes is still very
much with us, as reflected, most recently, by the decision of the United States Supreme Court finding
that the Boy Scouts was not a place of public accommodation and, as such, could exclude gays and
lesbians from its membership. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 657 (2000). Dale reflects the
continuing struggle over how much access is required when extending services or facilities to the public
inasmuch as it came to the Court following contradictory decisions from the California and New Jersey
Supreme Courts. See id. (discussing conflicting California and New Jersey Supreme Court decisions);
see also Curran v. Mount Diablo Council, 952 P.2d 218, 239 (Cal. 1998) (holding organization not
precluded from rejecting gay applicant on basis of sexual orientation because it was not a business
establishment within meaning of Act); Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1230 (N.J. 1999)
(holding organization violated law against discrimination for expelling openly gay member on basis of
sexual orientation and application of anti-discrimination law did not violate First Amendment rights).
42. Singer, supra note 40, at 1292.
43. Id. at 1351-57.
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With respect to the emerging importance of the Internet, the force of
Singer's observations is tremendous. They suggest, for example, that blind
individuals were correct to worry about their lack of a right of access to websites
on public accommodation grounds. As Singer has shown, the history of public
accommodation laws demonstrates that, as a legal and historical matter, those
laws have been used to limit access in a discriminatory fashion as much as to
provide for a right of accommodation. 44 If, however, one focuses on the preCivil War common law tradition, with its duty to serve principle, it becomes clear
that even when some feature of the Internet is privately owned, there is a basis
for assuring a degree of public access to it, and to do so on public
accommodation grounds. My argument aims, moreover, to consider the Internet
not just as a place of public accommodation for the disabled, but as a place that
45
must accommodate the public generally.
B. The Propertizationof the Internet and Limits on Access
Given the rapid propertization of cyberspace, this is an especially urgent
time to evaluate the proposition that the Internet is a place of public
accommodation for all. Lessig is the most prominent legal analyst of cyberspace,
issuing ominous, Cassandra-like calls lamenting the increasing concentration of
ownership in cyberspace. 46 Moreover, as Lessig and others have also
documented, the legal regulation of this newly concentrated ownership
increasingly is governed by private law principles. 47 For instance, Lessig worries
about the social effects of a highly privatized, contract-controlled Internet,

44. Id. at 1390-1400.
45. That being said, it seems unquestionably true that disabilities law is the arena in which these
questions are likely to prove most contentious. This is hardly surprising inasmuch as disability law is
the crucible on which the limits of modern public accommodation principles are being tested. See, e.g.,
Lawrence Berliner, An Evolving Americans With Disabilities Act: A Survey of Decisions Involving
Public Entities and Places of Public Accommodation From Courts Within the Second Circuit, 17
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 633, 683 (1998) (concluding that ADA will constantly evolve as people with
disabilities encounter public accommodations); Matthew A. Stowe, Note, Interpreting "Place of Public
Accommodation" Under Title III of the ADA: A Technical Determinationwith Potentially Broad Civil
Rights Implications,50 DUKE L.J. 297, 316-29 (2000) (arguing for broad construction of ADA to apply
not just to exclusion of disabled from physical spaces, but from non-location based membership
organizations as well).
46. See LESSIG, supra note 10, at 117 (asserting that world of cyberspace is far closer to world of
ideas than world of things).
47. See id. at 221 (encouraging rapid transition to regime of regulation-free right to innovate);
see also Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights
Management," 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 470 (1998) ("The emerging market for digital works displays a
similar emphasis on private ordering of entitlements and obligations.., made possible by the growing
use of "click-through" contracts for the online delivery of digital works and by new "rights
management" technologies that will allow copyright owners to set unilaterally and enforce
automatically the terms and conditions of access to digital content."); Mark A. Lemiey, The Law And
Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1257, 1260-61 (1998) (arguing for ordering
Internet according to public rather than private norms); SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 80-82 (noting
expanding use of copyright law and various forms of digital technology, such as "trusted systems,"
"clickwrap contracts," and "digital watermarks" for protecting digital information on the Internet).
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pleading that it is essential to strive to find the ideal balance between public and
private control. 48 In this he is not alone. Mark Lemley has observed that "a
spirit of openness and sharing, and a hostility to intellectual property and
exclusion" that characterized the early Internet (or, at least, is widely said to
have characterized it) may likely no longer prevail among the majority of its
users. 49 Moreover, establishing private norms tends, in the natural ordering of
50
such things, to favor the economically mighty over the economically weak.
Julie Cohen expresses concern that "the economic case for assigning strong,
undivided property rights in digital works is inadequate at best,"51 arguing for a
propertized conception of entitlements in cyberspace that embraces all citizen52
consumers.
It is then small wonder, that a central concern of much current legal debate
about Internet use focuses on conditions of access. Importantly for purposes of
the argument advanced in this Article, this is true for both the most and the least
tangible aspects of the Internet's structure. Consider the following recent
examples, all of which underscore the increasing concentration of social and
economic power on the Internet-with its potential to exclude those wishing to
gain unrestricted electronic access:
In 2002, Microsoft Corporation signed an Agreement and Consent Order
with the Federal Trade Commission, in which it agreed to cease monitoring of
"Microsoft7 .NET Passport." Microsoft introduced Passport in 1999, allegedly as
a convenient and secure way for users to authenticate their identity and thereby
navigate the Web for communication, information, and commercial purposes.
Microsoft was widely criticized, however, on the grounds that it was thus
attempting to create "an online tollbooth" that would both secure its control of
Internet resources and fail to provide consumers with promised privacy and
security protections.5 3 The Agreement and Consent Order obliges Microsoft to

48. LESSIG, supra note 10, at 204. Lessig even quotes, to this end, as surprising a source as Judge
Alex Kozinski, of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to the effect that
"reducing too much to private property can be bad medicine." Id. at 203.
49. Lemley, supra note 47, at 1268.
50. Id. at 1276-77 (noting, for example, desire of some firms to prevent "unauthorized" links to
clients' websites against "impecunious defendants," even though no legal basis for such claim exists).
It is worth adding, as well, that Lemley's observation is likely even more true today, four years after
publication of his paper.
51. Cohen, supra note 47, at 496.
52. Id. at 514-18. See also Gibbons, supra note 17, at 482-84 (identifying contract and tort
principles as those that will control delineation of rights over Internet).
53. Katherine Pfleger & Brier Dudley, Microsoft Settles Case on Privacy with FTC; Deal Forces
Audits for 20 Years, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 9, 2002, at C1 (reporting that Federal Trade Commission
ordered Microsoft to increase protection of user privacy). See also MICROSOFr.NET, PASSPORT:
BALANCED AUTHENTICATION

SOLUTIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND CONSUMERS (2002), available at

http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/2002/augO2/08-O8passport.asp (last visited Sept. 9, 2003)
(providing company's view of the advantages of Passport); Q&A: MICROSOFr's AGREEMENT WITH
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON PASSPORT, availableat http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/

features/2002/aug02/08-08passport.asp (last visited Sept. 9, 2003) (setting forth company's view of
advantages of Passport).
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submit to close scrutiny of the way in which it collects and uses information
54
gained from consumers, as well as respecting the security guarantees it makes.
In 2002, DoubleClick Inc., an online advertising agency, signed an
agreement with the Attorneys General of ten states after charges that it was
using consumer information gained from tracking individual users' Internet
meanderings without their permission.55 The agreement required DoubleClick
to pay $450,000 and limit its future use of such information. The settlement was
56
instantly characterized as a victory by consumer privacy advocates.
57
In the much-watched case of Intel Corporation v. Hamidi, a California
appellate court affirmed that disgruntled former Intel employee Hamidi was
liable for committing a trespass to chattels when he used Intel's internal e-mail
system to share his critical views of the company with thousands of company
employees. 58 It merits noting here that the finding of defendant's liability was
premised upon property damage by an intangible means, namely an electrical
signal that directed messages to plaintiff's employees on their computers.
The much-discussed "digital divide" separating haves and have-nots in both
this country 59 and abroad 6° also raises, at its most fundamental level, a question
about whether barriers to access (a form of boundary) are tolerable. This
example does not, like the previous three, address a specific legal dispute.
54. Federal Trade Commission, Agreement Containing Consent Order, In the Matter of
Microsoft Corporation (Aug. 8, 2002).
55. In the Matter of DoubleClick Inc., Agreement Between the Attorneys General of the States
of Arizona, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Vermont, and Washington and DoubleClick Inc. (Aug. 26,2002).
56. See, e.g., Robert O'Harrow Jr., Web Ad Firm to Limit Use of Profiles, WASH. POST, Aug. 27,
2002, at E01 (reporting that DoubleClick dropped plans to merge on-line and off-line information,
agreed not to use personally identifiable information about sexual orientation, social security numbers,
or medical or financial data, and agreed to alert computer users to placement of cookies).
57. 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244 (App. 2001).
58. The decision was subsequently reversed by Intel Corp. v. Hamidi,71 P.3d 32 (Cal. 2003). At
its simplest, the case pitted the company's right to exclude against an individual's right of access. I do
not here mean to suggest that Hamidi raises a public accommodation question. What I am saying,
however, is that the tension it makes evident between exclusion and access points to the normative
value of public accommodation law for the Internet.
59. See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destructionof Copyright: Napster and the New
Economics of Digital Technology 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263,324 (2002) (concluding we must take steps to
close the digital divide); Symposium, Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information Age, 20
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 1 (2002) (noting digital revolution has left many lives untouched);
www.digitaldividend.org (aiming to promote widespread digital access and website of the World
Resources Institute's Digital Dividend project) (last visited Sept. 12, 2003). Although these concerns
are not central to the topic of this paper, they are peripherally related to the argument advanced here.
See, e.g., FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, IN THE MATTER OF INQUIRY CONCERNING THE
DEPLOYMENT OF

ADVANCED TELECOMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY TO ALL AMERICANS IN A
REASONABLE AND TIMELY FASHION, AND POSSIBLE STEPS TO ACCELERATE SUCH DEPLOYMENT

PURSUANT TO SECTION 706 OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996, CC Docket 98-146 (Third

Report) (concluding that broadband technology is being made available in a reasonable and timely
fashion).
60. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, UNDERSTANDING THE

DIGITAL DIVIDE 8 (2001) (noting "digital divide reflects various differences among.., countries").
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Rather, it concerns the social and economic distinctions reinforced by the
economic structure of Internet service. Nonetheless, this example of the digital
divide does, like the previous three examples, beg the question of how best to
prevent unlawful status discrimination on the Internet.
For purposes of the argument advanced here, the importance of these
examples is that they highlight the ongoing struggle over Internet access. The
struggle, moreover, is everywhere, from the dispute over whether one can
commit a trespass to chattels on the Internet 6l to the prohibitions on disturbing
another's cyberspace with "spain" e-mail. 62 The question of whether a party's
property interest "resides" in her Internet domain name so as to raise a takings
claim under the Fifth Amendment of the United States or comparable provisions
of state Constitutions provides yet another example that is likely to recur. 63 Yet
the focus of most commentators interested in these developments has been on
the privacy implications of crossing boundaries-in these instances the
appropriate boundaries to which consumers are entitled to protect their personal
data. 64 And to the extent that the cases have considered property law issues,
such as in the domain names takings context, the concern has been with the
deprivation of rights rather than guarantees of access.
Property law, however, provides that there are occasions when individuals
should be entitled to access private property-at least on a limited basis-should
they wish to do so, and to be able to do so without suffering discrimination. The
Microsoft Passport and DoubleClick examples mentioned above both grew, in
part, out of the increasing difficulty consumers have had with accessing the
Internet if and when they refuse to be profiled. When consumers attempt to
disable "cookies," files that track a person's web surfing and shopping
preferences, it can be difficult to continue surfing or shopping. Thus, a Microsoft
user's refusal to use Passport or to be tracked by DoubleClick could have limited
the extent of their Internet access. One way to prevent such a restraint on access
is, of course, to guarantee some access-as, for example, by articulating a right of
public accommodation. Furthermore, to do so would prevent a form of
discrimination, inasmuch as profiling is, after all, a form of discrimination. The
discrimination here is to track and direct individuals on the basis of consumer
61. See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1020-23 (D. Ohio
1997) (mailing unsolicited emails could constitute trespass to chattels); see generally, Richard Warner,
Border Disputes: Trespass to Chattels on The Internet, 47 VILL. L. REV. 117 (2002) (contending that

applying trespass to chattels on Internet has tremendous implications).
62. See, e.g., Monsterhut, Inc. v. Paetec Communications, Inc., 741 N.Y.S.2d 820, 821 (App. Div.
2002) (claiming that ISP cannot terminate services for engaging in "spamming").
63. See, e.g., Dluhos v. Strasberg, WL 1720272, at *1-6 (D.N.J. 2001) (addressing plaintiffs
argument that defendant's use of domain name violated constitutional provisions).
64. See supra, note 50 for an example of one website's attempt to protect privacy. See also Rick
Whiting, Developing a Policy to Protect Customers is Only the Beginning, INFORMATION WEEK, Aug.

19, 2002, at 30 (arguing that website privacy policies are insufficient to protect user's privacy and that
websites need to develop advanced privacy protection technology and increase spending on privacy);
Go On, Watch Me-Surveillance, Privacy and the Electronic Society, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 17, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 7247127 (arguing that data collection systems could avoid hacker's abuse of
systems to invade consumer's privacy).
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preferences and personal interests. Granted, this is unlike what we may now
think of as "traditional" discrimination-that is, discrimination on the basis of
race, ethnicity, or religion, for instance-but it is discrimination nonetheless. An
individual should be able to obtain at least limited access without also being
subject to such discrimination.
A striking characteristic of the above examples is that they validate the
concerns about the concentration of private power on the Internet, with no
corresponding access guarantee for those who lack the social and economic
capital to control the Internet's "architecture." As Singer's historical analysis of
United States public accommodation law confirms, whenever this sort of
disequilibrium occurs between those who control a resource and those who lack
control, the tendency is to exclude those who lack control unless they agree to
adhere to the terms of the powerful entity.
This is not, I should emphasize, merely a question of Internet control by the
biggest e-players, such as Microsoft and Intel. Smaller players participate in the
act of exclusion every day as well. By contrast to the examples detailed above,
one can easily point to a wide variety of situations where, if it may not ultimately
be appropriate to assure the public a full right of access, it is at least worth
assuring some degree of access, and delimiting the terms on which access is
available. In this connection, the following examples serve as well as any others:
The Los Angeles Times provides free registration for Internet users who
wish to access its website. Registration requires, however, that the user's
Internet browser accept cookies, and requires the user to submit information
about her annual household income.65 What is questionable here, from a public
accommodations standpoint, is the theoretical justification for exclusion on these
bases.
Community of Science ("COS") bills itself as "the leading Internet site for
the global research and development community." Access to COS, which is
privately held, is free, provided that one is an individual associated with an
institution or a corporation. 66 In other words, individuals with no such affiliation
have no possibility for accessing information on COS about sources of research
and development funding in the sciences, not to mention information about who
is currently conducting such research and development, even though a large
number of such persons are state-funded. In at least two respects, theneducation and professional affiliation-the site discriminates against individuals.
Arguably, it may also discriminate on the basis of income. None of these, of
course, are protected classes, although it seems likely that the ranks of such
excluded persons are disproportionately filled with members of classes
frequently receiving special protections-racial and ethnic minorities, women,
and the disabled, to cite just a few.
The Vietnam Helicopter Pilots Association ("VHPA") has private spaces
on its website for "members only. ' 67 Although the VHPA receives the privileges
65. http://www.latimes.com/services/site/registration (last visited Sept. 12, 2003).
66. http://www.cos.com/about (last visited Sept. 12, 2003).
67. For private areas of the website of the Vietnam Helicopter Pilots Association, which is a
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accorded by the state to non-profit entities, it excludes people on the Internet
who did not share in the experiences of its members, even though the members'
experiences had national and state-sponsored aspects.
Of course, private
associations are traditionally accorded exclusion from the reach of the public
accommodation laws, 68 and arguably the VHPA fits the profile of such an
association. Yet it is also worth questioning why a status derived from service to
the country permits exclusion of those who did not serve the country in exactly
the same way.
The National Association of Medical Communicators ("NAMC") aims to
"represent all professionals interested in communicating about health and
medicine," and so represents the interests of its 285 medical and health journalist
members through funding from the Bayer Corporation. 69 The information made
available to its members with Bayer's support presumably does not make its way
into print under Bayer's trademark, but rather under that of mainstream media
outlets. As with the VHPA example above, the exclusive portions of the
NAMC's e-spaces raise concerns about what information is being denied to the
public, and why.
Notably, in each of the above examples, the discrimination is not based on
what might be called a person's "visible" status-race, gender, or disability
(some of the traditional categories deemed to merit specific public
accommodation protection.) But it is status discrimination nonetheless, and
likely has the effect of creating a highly segregated and differentiated society.
Maybe a newspaper should be permitted to provide its online services only if a
user agrees to provide income information, but maybe not. Perhaps a medical
journalist and a Vietnam War helicopter pilot are entitled to share their benefits,
goods, and privileges only with one another, but perhaps not. The point is that it
is essential to establish norms for when people can exclude and when they must
include (must provide access) even if only on a limited basis. Interestingly, the
examples above suggest that the Internet privileges access based on income,
occupation, or other factors, in much the same way that the post-Civil War
public accommodation laws differentiated white from black in determining the
terms of access to commercial establishments. 70 And if in our society it is not
knowledge but access to information that makes power possible, this
discrimination must concern us.
These examples raise two concerns relevant to the theme of this paper.
First, they suggest exclusion on the basis of ability to pay-a common feature of
much current Internet activity. Quite unlike the traditional patron-customer
relationship, a great deal of what is available on the Internet is available only if
one pays first and looks second.

501(c)(18) under the Internal Revenue Code, see http://www.vhpadata.org/index.htm (last visited
Sept. 12, 2003).
68. See infra Part II.C.2. for a discussion of which entities are public accommodations.
69. http://www.ibiblio.org/namc/index.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2003).
70. See Singer, supra note 40 at 1351-57 (discussing post-Civil War racial segregation laws
denying access to public accommodations such as railroad cars).
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Second, and for my purposes even more troubling, the examples suggest
exclusion on some less obvious criteria. The increasingly centralized and
privatized Internet makes possible the arbitrary or deliberate exclusion of classes
of individuals large and small. 71 Although status discrimination has not to date
been a central feature of cyber-interaction, 72 there is no necessary impediment to
this happening, and given the tendency of humans to be parochial and
73
xenophobic when it suits their interests, the possibility is a real one.
There is no reason to suppose that the Internet is not being or will not be
used to perpetuate status discrimination of a sort that we have witnessed before
in our national history, from credit redlining 74 to job discrimination 75 or housing
opportunity violations. 76 Indeed, our very sorry national history in these areas
suggests that the Internet provides but the newest avenue to perpetuate such
forms of status discrimination. 77 I do not mean to suggest here that evidence of

71. Hardy considers, for example, the use of "technical access restrictions" to exclude potential
patrons on the basis of some preordained criteria. See Hardy, supra note 19, at par. 5 (considering use
of "technical access restrictions" to exclude potential patrons on basis of preordained criteria). Mark
Lemley notes the non-homogenous character of community on the Net by its denizens, "Netizens" in
his telling, citing examples of the way in which the Internet serves to bring together like-minded types.
Lemley, supra note 47, at 1271 n.75. But see Developments, The Law of Cyberspace, Part IV: Internet
Regulation Through Architectural Modification: The Property Rule Structure of Code Solutions, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1634-57 (1999) (applying Calabresi/Melamed liability-or-property rule
framework, arguing for "code solutions" to problems of cyberspace instead of government regulation);
Lawrence Lessig, Open Code and Open Societies: Values of Internet Governance, 74 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1405, 1408 (1999) (stating "the code of cyberspace-whether the Internet, or a net within the
Internet--defines the space. It constitutes that space. And as with any constitution, it builds within
itself a set of values and possibilities that governs life there."); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse:
What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 517-19 (1999) (noting ability to regulate Internet
is highly dependent on architecture or code of cyberspace and successful regulation will likely involve
alteration of system design); Lawrence Lessig, The Limits in Open Code: Regulatory Standards and the
Future of the Net, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 759, 762 (1999) (developing notions of Internet space and
values); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through
Technology, 76 TEx L. REV. 553, 557 (1998) (noting technology imposes its own set of rules for
regulation of communication networks).
72. Or, at least, status discrimination has not emerged as a regulatory or legal question. It merits
observing, however, that discrimination in other aspects of electronic institution-building have come to
widespread public attention, such as in concerns about the so-called racial, ethnic and economic
"digital divide." See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the digital divide.
73. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal
Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395, 453-60 (2000) (discussing likelihood of status discrimination
in cyberspace).
74. See, e.g., Am. Bankers Ass'n v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 93 F. Supp. 2d 35, 57-58 (D.D.C.
2000) (finding defendant liable for engaging in credit redlining on basis of race).
75. See, e.g., McCroan v. Bailey, 543 F. Supp. 1201, 1202-03, 1208 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (permitting
lawsuit alleging violation of federal employment discrimination).
76. See, e.g., Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1293 (7th
Cir. 1977) (noting zoning decision can constitute violation of federal fair housing laws); 300 Gramatan
Ave. Assoc. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 379 N.E.2d 1183, 1188 (N.Y. 1978) (finding legal violation
for failure to rent on basis of race).
77. Gary A. Hernandez, Katherine J. Eddy & Joel Muchmore, Insurance Weblining & Unfair
Discrimination in Cyberspace, 54 S.M.U. L. REV. 1953, 1971-72 (2001) (arguing Internet has led to
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status discrimination in any of these areas would not trigger liability under
applicable statutes.78 The problem is that existing statutes are insufficient to
bring within their reach all of the participants who help deliver the goods and
services now characterized as the Internet. 79 What I suggest, therefore, is that
actors in cyberspace-even if not the direct provider of the good or serviceneed to be recognized as playing a part in such actual or potential status
80
discrimination.
One possible means to combat such activity is through the reach of public
accommodation laws. For public accommodation purposes, the law should
respond similarly to an airline that prevented the blind from accessing its
website 81 and to the owner of a food convenience store who refused to permit
members of a protected class to play video games inside the store. 82 Put another
way, as Justice Black reaffirmed nearly forty years ago, no matter how limited
one's role might seem in the provision of goods and services, the larger
consequences of an activity must be considered as within the reach of the public
83
accommodation laws.
The point here is that the ISPs, along with the other parties who construct
the architecture and maintain the electronic infrastructure that is cyberspace,
play a key role in the delivery of information-and thus to its accessibility. It
follows that if an entity assists access for one consumer of goods, services, or
facilities available through its operation, then it should assist the access of all
such takers, and on equal terms. As our descriptive vocabulary for cyberspace
suggests, at the most basic conceptual level, we conceive of cyberspace as little
different from the kinds of physical entities now routinely understood to be
places of public accommodation. 84 In short, given the current trend of
unfair discrimination in insurance industry);

CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY, PUBLIC

WORKSHOP ON ONLINE PROFILING: TESTIMONY OF THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY

availableat http://www.cdt.org/testimony/
991108mulligan.shtml (last visited Sept. 7,2003); Marcia Stapanek, Weblining, BUSINESSWEEK, Apr. 3,
2000, availableat http://www.businessweek.comt2000/00_14/b3675027.htm. (last visited Sept. 7, 2003).
78. See, for instance, Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691a (2003); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 62 (2003); Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (2003); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2003).
79. See supra Part II.C.2 for a discussion of the scope of entities under the reach of public
accommodation statutes.
80. See, e.g., Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1004-05 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding
newspapers within reach of Fair Housing Act when they printed advertisements showing only white,
European-American models offering new homes).
81. See Access Now, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1314 (arguing that Title II of Americans with
Disabilities Act mandated airline's website be accessible to blind).
82. See U.S. v. Baird, 85 F.3d 450, 452-55 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding 7-11 store place of public
accommodation under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(3) even though video game machines in store were not
installed with intention to create place of exhibition or entertainment, and even though minimal
revenue was generated).
83. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 273-74 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring) (holding local operations inside scope of Title II because of interstate commerce
implications of the activity).
84. Consider, for example, the Court's description of a motel in downtown Atlanta:
BEFORE THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Nov. 8,1999),
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concentrating ownership on the Internet and the related emergence of a
contract-based regime for regulating that power, 85 the likelihood that not only
be excluded
Cohen's "citizen-consumers," but also citizens qua citizens could
86
from some or all portions of the Internet looms very large indeed.
In what follows, then, it is my aim to outline the ways in which the property
rules known as the law of public accommodation offer one powerful means to
secure public entitlements in the ever-expanding cyber-territory of the Internet,
while simultaneously not infringing upon valid private interests. To that end, the
remainder of this paper will consider the relevance of the law of public
accommodation to Internet regulation.
C. Some Private Concerns: The FirstAmendment
First, however, key private concerns regarding control of the Internet's
layers need to be acknowledged. Of course, "public" accommodation only has
meaning if the public-ness of a thing is placed in opposition to its "private"
qualities. Chief among these are concerns about free speech guarantees and the
related need to protect truly private associations from the requirement that they
be deemed places of public accommodation.
1. Free Speech
In public accommodation law, much of what drives the concern to protect
individuals' rights of both free speech and association arises in light of

The motel is located on Courtland Street, two blocks from downtown Peachtree Street. It is
readily accessible to interstate highways 75 and 85 and state highways 23 and 41. Appellant
solicits patronage from outside the State of Georgia through various national advertising
media, including magazines of national circulation; it maintains over 50 billboards and
highway signs within the State, soliciting patronage for the motel; it accepts convention trade
from outside Georgia and approximately 75% of its registered guests are from out of State.
Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 243.
The Court's emphasis on the accessibility of the motel, as well as its advertising efforts and
visibility are equally true, in terms of commercial and social role, of cyber-commerce today.
85. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1134
(2000) (citing views of "[a) number of commentators" who "have observed that, in an information
economy, an increasing commodification of information and a creation of new property rights seems
almost inevitable"). Samuelson herself rejects a property model for the protection of privacy in
cyberspace in favor of a more contract-like licensing model. Id. at 1172. Her worries about the
shortcomings of a property regime to protect personal information on the Internet include restraints
on alienability and civil rights claims. Id. at 1138-44.
86. See supra notes 47, 51-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of Cohen's analysis. The
concern that exclusions from cyberlife will have deleterious consequences for the democratic process
increasingly concern constitutional scholars as well. Cass Sunstein, for one, worries about what he
perceives about the hyper-individualized (as opposed to socially-engaged) nature of the dot.com
experience, worrying that, for instance, it will undercut freedom, which "consists not simply in
preference satisfaction but also in the chance to have preferences and beliefs formed under decent
conditions-in the ability to have preferences formed after exposure to a sufficient amount of
information, and also to an appropriately wide and diverse range of options." Sunstein, supra note 8,
at 50.
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guarantees provided by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
As with concerns about protecting rights of private association discussed below,
it is not the ambition of this article to answer here complicated questions about
free speech in cyberspace. This requires a nuanced analysis looking at, for
example, the nature of the Internet speech and the circumstances under which it
is made. 87 For my purposes, it is sufficient here to note the validity of these
concerns and to argue that they not be used-in cyberspace as in real space-as
a ruse to perpetuate unlawful status discrimination against persons or groups
that society deems worthy of access guarantees. s8 In addition, I am arguing for a
right of access only, and not for a right to be protected from a hostile or offensive
public accommodations environment. The point needs to be made because
many recent public accommodations claims have argued that an abusive public
accommodations environment constitutes a violation of public accommodations
protections. 89 It would inhibit robust debate to insist that anything electronically
accessible would be guaranteed not to offend anyone, and, therefore, at least
provisionally, I am arguing here only for a right of access. That being said, it is
also surely true that scenarios can be imagined where e-content was so
repellent-for example, a public website offensively and abusively critical of
members of a protected class-that it might be deemed violative of public
accommodations principles. Until such a case and its particular facts are present,
however, I would insist only on a right of access.
2. Private Association
As noted earlier, antebellum common law in the United States found a duty
to serve only when an entity was "holding oneself out to the public." 90
Conversely, of course, when an entity does not hold itself out as open, there is no
such duty. This thinking is the basis for the modern exemption from the reach of
public accommodation laws of, for instance, "a private club or other
establishment not in fact open to the public." 91
What exactly it means for an entity not to be "in fact open to the public," is
87. See, e.g., Ku, supra note 59, at 269 (examining whether copyright protection for digital works
is necessary and addressing role of copyright in production of Internet speech). Furthermore, the
importance of such questions seems likely to continue to engage the attention of the Supreme Court.
See generally Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 585 (2002) (finding Child Online
Protection Act not constitutionally overbroad on First Amendment grounds); Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002) (holding virtual child pornography distinguishable from child
pornography depicting real persons); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874-79 (1997)
(striking down overly broad sections of Communications Decency Act on First Amendment grounds).
88. See, e.g., Lauren J. Rosenblum, Note, Equal Access or Free Speech: The Constitutionalityof
Public Accommodation Laws, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1243, 1272-73 (1997) (concluding that public

accommodation law should be upheld, since it is content-neutral and cannot be deemed an invalid
infringement of First Amendment rights).
89. See, e.g.,

Eugene

Volokh,

Freedom of Speech, Harassment Law, and the

Clinton

Administration, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 299, 302 (2000) (examining several cyberspace speech
controversies involving hostile environment harassment law).
90. Singer, supra note 40, at 1318.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (West 1994).
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not always a question with a ready answer. Suffice it to say, however, that the
analysis used to answer this question in the Internet context need be no different
than that used for clubs with far more fixed physical locations. Thus, for
might
example, questions such as the exclusivity or shared interests of members
92
be grounds for exclusion under the private association exemption.
It should be noted that, in Cyberspace, concerns about an entity's size
present particularly vexing questions with respect to the possible cover to be
provided by the private association exemption. Given the potentially universal
reach of cyberspace, the traditional justification for those seeking application of
the private association exemption, namely that the lines dividing associational
interests can be drawn by arbitrary numerical distinctions, will likely not prove
especially serviceable. Where Internet chat rooms can have many thousands of
members, for instance, it would be ludicrous 93to suggest that such a cyberspace
was private if it had 399 members, but not 400.

92. See, e.g., New York State Club Ass'n Inc. v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 5 (1988). (involving a
challenge to New York City's anti-discrimination ordinance, Local Law 63, which was "adopted...
[s]oon after the Federal Government adopted civil rights legislation to bar discrimination in places of
public accommodation"). The Supreme Court concluded that Local Law 63 "merely prevents an
association from using race, sex, and the other specified characteristics as shorthand measures in place
of what the city considers to be more legitimate criteria for determining membership." Id. at 13. See
also Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n Inc., 410 U.S. 431,438 (1972) (noting that club that
adopted racially-discriminatory guest policy was not "a truly private association because we found 'no
plan or purpose of exclusiveness') (quoting Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 236 (1969));
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972) (holding exclusion of black man from service at
private club restaurant did not entitle plaintiff to assert state action doctrine and, thus, a Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection claim merely because club received a liquor license from the state);
supra notes 85-86 (discussing potential for exclusion from Internet when property or individualcentered model prevails).
Moose Lodge illustrates a concern about the scope of this exemption that continues to plague
public accommodation law and will likely be repeated with respect to cyberspace and public
accommodation law. As dissenters Justices Douglas and Marshall pointed out in Moose Lodge, the
number of liquor licenses granted by the State of Pennsylvania was limited and doled out on a
restricted basis by state authorities, and so may effectively have precluded blacks who wanted them
from obtaining them:
This state-enforced scarcity of licenses restricts the ability of blacks to obtain liquor, for
liquor is commercially available only at private clubs for a significant portion of each week.
Access by blacks to places that serve liquor is further limited by the fact that the state quota
is filled. A group desiring to form a nondiscriminatory club which would serve blacks must
purchase a license held by an existing club, which can exact a monopoly price for the
transfer. The availability of such a license is speculative at best, however, for, as Moose
Lodge itself concedes, without a liquor license a fraternal organization would be hard
pressed to survive.
Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 182-83.
In cyberspace, the Moose Lodge dissenters' concerns could be replicated, for example, in the
allocation of bandwidth, arguably a limited resource. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 10, at 46-47 (arguing
that controlling bandwidth allocation with pricing system would solve problems of overcrowding on
Internet without treating different types of data differently); Cohen, supra note 47, at 480 (criticizing
neoliberal economic view that Internet resources should be allocated according to those who value
them most highly in economic terms).
93. The example is drawn from New York State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 19. In the Internet
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THE RELEVANCE OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION PRINCIPLES TO INTERNET
ACCESS

At first glance, the Internet presents a serious conceptual hurdle for those
who, like me, wish to argue that it is a place of public accommodation. In brief,
the difficulty can be reduced to a problem of directional prepositions: one has to
go to most places of public accommodation. By contrast, one invites the Internet
into one's own home or workplace. That is, unlike say, a restaurant, railroad car,
or casino, the Internet is typically accessed in the most protected-and thus, in
some sense, the most "private" spaces. 94 And even some public accommodation
laws with broad coverage do not require businesses other than retail
establishments to open themselves up to the public, much less private
95

homeowners.
This very problem is one, for example, that has bedeviled the recent history
of Title III, the public accommodations section of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"). 96 In brief, the federal appellate courts are
sharply split on the question of whether there must be a "there" there for
purposes of triggering Title III coverage. 97 That is, the courts are divided as to

context, Justice O'Connor's observation in her concurrence proves especially prescient.
94. For instance, the U.S. Census Bureau reports that 51% of U.S. households now have one or
more home computers, a 42% increase since December 1998, which at least suggests that more people
access computers at home than at the public library. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOME COMPUTERS
AND INTERNET USE IN THE UNITED STATES: AUGUST2000 (Sept. 2001).
95. See, e.g., Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a6 (West 1994)
(prohibiting discrimination or segregation in places of public accommodation). But see, e.g., Unruh
Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b) (West 1982) (providing that "[a]ll persons within the
jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry,
national origin, disability, or medical condition are entitled to the full and equal accommodations,
advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.");
Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. § 363.03, Subdivision 3 (a) (2002) (making it "an unfair discriminatory
practice: (1) to deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation because of race,
color, creed, religion, disability, national origin, marital status, sexual orientation, or sex, or for a
taxicab company to discriminate in the access to, full utilization of, or benefit from service because of a
person's disability"); Law Against Discrimination, N.J. Stat. § 10:5-4 (2003) (guaranteeing "all persons
shall have the opportunity to obtain employment, and to obtain all the accommodations, advantages,
facilities, and privileges of any place of public accommodation, publicly assisted housing
accommodation, and other real property without discrimination because of race, creed, color, national
origin, ancestry, age, marital status, affectional or sexual orientation, familial status, or sex, subject
only to conditions and limitations applicable alike to all persons. This opportunity is recognized as and
declared to be a civil right."). See generally Singer, supra note 40, at 1478-95 (comparing scope of
federal and state public accommodation laws); see also Steven B. Arbuss, Comment, The Unruh Civil
Rights Act. An Uncertain Guarantee, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 443, 443 (1983) (criticizing inherent
vagueness of statute's protection for "business establishments"). Although nearly 20 years old, the
language remains, as does the potency of this critique.
96. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (West 1995). See also
infra notes 127-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the historical development of the notion
of places of public accommodation.
97. Compare, e.g., Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035, 1056 (lth Cir. 2001) (holding
denying long-term disability benefits because claimants disability mental, not physical, prohibited by
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whether a place of public accommodation must be a fixed, physical location.
This split is reflected in the federal district courts as well, 98 and dueling law
review articles further mirror this disagreement. 99 Although I will return below

ADA unless discrimination exempted under ADA safe harbor provision), McNeil v. Time Ins. Co.,
205 F.3d 179, 187-88 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding insurer not in violation of Title II when offering
insurance policy limiting coverage for AIDS), Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 564 (7th
Cir. 1999), and Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 614 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding plaintiff failed
to state claim under Title II of ADA because provisions of disability benefits not public
accommodation), with Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28,33 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding Title III
regulates sale of insurance policies in insurance offices subject to ADA's safe harbor provision) reh'g
denied 204 F.3d 392, and Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, Inc.,
37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding establishments of public accommodation not limited under Title
III to physical structures). The question of whether the Internet is a "place" recurs in other areas of
the law as well. See Michael Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet
Jurisdiction,16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345-1406 (2001) (discussing developing standard determining
Internet jurisdiction).
98. Compare, e.g., Baker v. Hartford Ins. Co., 1995 WL 573430 (N.D. I11. Sept. 28, 1995)
(following Carparts rationale to hold that physical place is not required for Title III coverage) with
Leonard v. Israeli Discount Bank of N.Y., 967 F. Supp. 802, 804-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (rejecting Carparts
rationale and holding that physical place is required for Title III coverage). District Courts are
similarly split. See, e.g., Wai v. Allstate Ins. Co., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding Title III of
ADA applicable to denial of insurance policy based on disability); Chabner v. United of Omaha Life
Ins. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1185, 1193 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (holding insurance underwriting covered by ADA
Title III); Cloutier v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 964 F. Supp. 299,302 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (finding ADA
Title III applicable to company's denial of application from HIV-positive applicant); World Ins. v.
Branch, 966 F. Supp 1203, 1209 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (finding Title III claim when insurance company
capped AIDS related coverage); Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1165 (E.D. Va. 1997)
(concluding Title III prohibits insurance company from discriminating on basis of disability policies
available through employer); Shultz v. Hemet Youth Pony League, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1222, 1225 (C.D.
Cal. 1996) (holding youth baseball league operated place of public accommodation); Kotev v. First
Colony Life Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp 1316, 1320-21 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (finding ADA Title III applicable in
denying insurance application based on association with HIV-positive spouse); Doukas v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422,427 (D.N.H.1996) (finding Title III applies to insurance company's coverage
denial). But see cases from federal district courts endorsing the opposite Carpartsrationale, including:
Matthews v. Nat'l Coll. Athletic Ass'n, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1206 (E.D. Wa. 1999) (holding NCAA not
place of public accommodation because only regulate eligibility and membership criteria of member
institutions and student-athletes); Erwin v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1227, 1233
(S.D. Ind. 1998) (holding Title III not applicable to long-term disability plan because insurer not a
place of public accommodation); Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 204, 207 (N.D.N.Y.
1998) (holding Title III not intended to address insurance underwriting policies); Nearhood v.
Freestate Health Plan, Inc., 1997 WL 151545,2 (D. Md. 1997) (finding "insurer" not "employer" under
ADA); Cortez v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 960 F. Supp. 113, 117 (W.D. Tx. 1997) (finding no NBA
violation of Title III when game occurs without captioning or interpretive patron in stadium operated
by City of San Antonio); Good v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Md., Inc., 1996 WL 815373, 1 (D. Md.
1996) (finding insurer not employer under ADA); Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey, 922 F. Supp 217, 223 (E.D.
Mo. 1996) (concluding youth hockey league not place of public accommodation); Pappas v. Bethesda
Hosp. Ass'n, 861 F. Supp. 616, 620 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (holding hospital association employer and
employee benefits administrator not place of public accommodation); and Schaaf v. Ass'n of Educ.
Therapists, 1995 WL 381979, 1 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (finding organization without nexus to particular
physical facility for holding meeting not public accommodation).
99. See Kelly E. Konkright, Comment, An Analysis of the Applicability of Title III of the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct to Private Internet Access Providers, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 713, 745 (2001)
(adopting view of Parker and its progeny); Justin D. Petruzzelli, Note, Adjust Your Font Size: Websites

2003] INTERNET ACCESS AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION LAW

249

to the disabilities cases, it is not my intention here to enter into that doctrinal
debate. 10 Instead, my purpose is to endorse the view that from a theoretical,
historical, and normative perspective, the Internet-from its physical structure to
the rules embedded in the code that makes it operate-should be understood to
create property rights that are subject to public accommodation principles. In
short, as I shall argue in this section, because the Internet represents an
expanded method for transmitting information, providing opportunities for
social interaction, and generating commerce, it is appropriate to apply public
accommodation principles to its regulation.
This is vitally important,
furthermore, by virtue of the actual and potential scale and reach of the Internet.
With each passing day, the dizzying volume of commercial transactions and
interpersonal interactions made possible by the Internet add to its importance in
our social and economic life. As a result, it is essential to establish clear terms
for access. First, however, it is necessary to review briefly the history and trend
of the modern law of public accommodation in order to provide context for a full
discussion of the Internet as a place of public accommodation.
A. The Modern History of Public Accommodation Law
Three things characterize the modern law of public accommodation in the
United States. First, as the New Jersey Supreme Court memorably put it: "The
denial of freedom of reasonable access in some States following passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the creation of a common law freedom to
arbitrarily exclude following invalidation of segregation statutes, suggest that the
10 1
current majority rule may have less than dignified origins."
The New Jersey court referred to the metaphor that most law students
learn, namely that the right to hold property can be conceptualized as a "bundle
of sticks" of which the "biggest stick" in the bundle is the right to exclude. In its
standard incarnation, this doctrine provides that the sole exceptions to the
absolute right to exclude are imposed upon "innkeepers" and "common
carriers." The standard justifications for these exceptions include the quasipublic nature of these activities, protection against monopoly control, assurance

Are Public Accommodations under The Americans with Disabilities Act, 53 RUTGERs L. REV. 1063,

1080 (2001) (advocating reasoning of Carparts and its progeny); see also Jonathan Bick, Americans
with Disabilities Act and the Internet, 10 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH., 205, 214 (2000) (noting that Internet

should be understood as a place of public accommodation under ADA Title III); Stowe, supra note 45,
at 299 (arguing for broad construction of ADA to apply not just to exclusion of disabled from physical
spaces but from non-location based membership organizations as well).
100. Answering the question of whether, as a matter of current law, the ADA can be understood
to apply to insurance purchased through one's employer instead of from the insurer directly, as the
case law considers, is not my goal. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
exclusion of this issue.
101. See Uston v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370, 373-74 (N.J. 1982) (expanding common
law exceptions to right to exclude to include places of entertainment and recreation) (quoting Bell v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 296 (1964)); see also Singer, supra note 40, at 1393-1400 (discussing legal
narrowing of duty to serve to reinforce racial segregation).
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of a "fundamental right" to travel, and reasons of safety and public health. 10 2
Second, it is indisputably true that the modern law of public accommodation
has, principally since the Civil Rights reforms of the 1960s, been expanded to
declare all private operations that serve the public in any way as open to the
103
gender, 1°4 marital status, 10 5
entire public, regardless of, for example, race,
sexual orientation, 10 6 or disability. 07
The tendency of modern public
accommodation law has been to find that most activities are considered public
accommodations, regardless of whether the accommodation is provided in a
fixed physical location. 08 Furthermore, braced with support from the United
States Supreme Court, federal courts have found that places that are private for
most purposes may still, under special circumstances, be deemed places of public
accommodation. 10 9 The modern law of public accommodation thus tends to
confirm that, to qualify as a place of public accommodation, the "there" there

102. Singer, supra note 40, at 443.
103. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2002) (prohibiting discrimination or segregation on basis of race
in places of public accommodation).
104. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101 (2001) (prohibiting gender based discrimination).
105. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3900(B)(1) (West 2002) (prohibiting discrimination based on
marital status in places of public accommodation).
106. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46a-81d(a) (2002) (prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation in places of public accommodation, resort, or amusement).
107. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-6-5 (West 1999) (requiring equal access to all public
conveyances, public accommodations, resorts, amusements, and other places open to general public
for visually and physically disabled persons subject to federal or state regulations as similarly
applicable to all persons).
108. The best known examples in support of this view are Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609 (1984) and Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
Arguably, the reach of these decisions has, however, been cut back by the Supreme Court's most
recent major public accommodations case, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 657 (2000)
(finding that Boy Scouts of America was entitled to define terms of its membership and therefore
exclude, e.g., homosexuals and atheists). See also Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1269-70
(7th Cir. 1993) (rejecting claim under Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964 that Boy Scouts can be an
"establishment" that "serves the public" as a membership organization: "The Boy Scouts is as
different from the facilities listed in Title II as dogs are from cats.").
109. For example, golf courses that are usually closed to all but their members, can be considered
places of public accommodation for Title III of the ADA purposes when a public tournament is being
held there. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 1002 (9th Cir. 2000), affd, PGA Tour, Inc. v.
Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001) (holding golf course place of public accommodation during PGA
tournament).; see also Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 55 F. Supp. 2d 926, 937-38 (N.D. Ind.
1999) (holding while operation of tournament was place of public accommodation under ADA, use of
golf cart not required because would fundamentally change nature of tournament). I do not mean to
suggest, however, that the private club exemption is without force. See, e.g., Kelsey v. Univ. Club of
Orlando, Inc., 845 F. Supp. 1526, 1531 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (holding that private men's club which fired
barber after his heart bypass operation could do so as a private club, and was not liable to fired
employee as a place of public accommodation under Title III of ADA). See generally Tracy Elizabeth
Walsh, Note, The PGA is Subject to the ADA Because it is Not a Private Club and its Tournaments Are
Place of Public Accommodation-Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 599, 624
(1999) (arguing Martin decided correctly); Scott A. Weinberg, Note, Analysis of Martin v. Professional
Golfers' Ass'n Tour, Inc.-Applying the ADA to the PGA is a Hole in one for Disabled Golfers, 38
BRANDEIs L.J. 757, 776 (2000) (arguing Martin situation as one Congress intended ADA to apply to).
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need not be permanent. What is more, modern public accommodation law
suggests that what is private may not always be so when there are larger public
interests at stake.
Third, recent scholarship, notably that of Joseph Singer, has demonstrated
that the alleged genealogy of the common law right to exclude may not only be
less than dignified, it may be less than exact. Singer's exhaustive review of 19th
and 20th century public accommodation law suggests that the controlling
criterion for what makes something a place of public accommodation should not
be evaluated along some private/public axis, focusing on the rights of private
property owners to exclude. Instead, there is good reason to believe that, even
under the principles of stare decisis, the case law supports a focus instead on the
nature of the enterprise. For example, an early 18th century British court
explained that "[i]f one held oneself out as open to the public ...then one was
Similarly,
necessarily engaged in a 'public trade or employment.""' 10
"Blackstone treated the act of hanging out a sign as an invitation to come on the
premises to do business of a certain kind, the act of stepping inside and offering
money as an acceptance, and the refusal to do business as a breach of
'
In this country, no less a commentator than Justice Story
contract."111
emphasized "that common carriers 'exercise... a public employment' when they
'undertake to carry goods for persons generally' and when they 'hold
[themselves] out as ready to engage in the transportation of goods for hire as a
business, not as a casual occupation."' 112 If, therefore, an operation undertakes
to serve the public, it has a duty to do so in a thoroughly non-discriminatory
113
fashion.
Singer's legal-historical analysis implies that the trend to expand the
coverage of public accommodation law 114 may well be wholly consistent with the
common law tradition, rather than an amendment of it. In this light, recent
ADA Title III case law affirming a broad reading of the law's public
accommodation principles is wholly appropriate. For instance, a line of ADA
Title III cases demonstrates little sympathy for parties seeking cover under the
"private club" exemption that is a standard feature of most accommodation
laws." 5 The courts' resistance to allowing litigants to find safe harbor in such an
110. Singer, supra note 40, at 1307 (quoting Gisbourn v. Hurst, 91 Eng. Rep. 220 (K.B. 1710)).
111. Id. at 1310.
112. Id. at 1324-25 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS, WITH
ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE CIVIL AND THE FOREIGN LAW § 495,322 (1832)).

113. Id. at 1297.
114. Compare Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1-4) (West 1994)
(including only four categories of public accommodation), with Americans with Disabilities Act 42
U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A-L) (West 1997) (including over twelve categories of public accommodation).
115. See, e.g., Indep. Living Res. v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 760 n.84 (D. Or. 1997)
(operators of athletic stadia cannot claim that limited access luxury suites are entitled to private club
exemption under ADA Title II when located inside a place of public accommodation and operators
are not even leaseholders); United States v. Landsdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. 785, 823 (E.D. Pa.
1989) (holding swim club that excluded African-Americans not entitled to protection as private club
under Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964); Harford v. City of Santa Clarita, No. B144255, slip op. at 37
(Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Jan. 10, 2002) (finding Alcoholics Anonymous was not private club and was
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exemption is fully in line with the antebellum common law right of access.
Similarly, ADA cases finding that cost is not a satisfactory defense to statutory
compliance is consistent with the common law origins of public accommodation
law as Singer describes them, 1 6 as are cases finding a denial of a service merely
1 17
because it was not provided in a particular, physical location.
With respect to the argument advanced in this article, Singer's analysis
deserves to be understood in light of the concerns of those who fear the
consequences of excess private ordering on the Internet noted above.118 Given
such contemporary concerns and the history of public accommodation laws used
after the Civil War-not to prevent exclusion but rather to permit property
owners to exclude in all but a limited number of instances-the applicability of
public accommodation laws to cyberspace needs to be established.
B. Where's the There There? Determining What Aspects of the Internet Should
be Deemed Places of Public Accommodation
It is essential to clarify precisely which Internet resources might be subject
to regulation as places of public accommodation. Lessig provides a useful
conceptual model in this regard with his description of the "three contexts where
resources in the Internet are held in common."" 9 Lessig argues that commonly
held resources constitute the "innovation commons" that is the Internet. 20 For
purposes of the argument advanced here, the crucial feature of the innovation
commons is formed not merely through the development of social norms "but
also through a specific technical architecture." This technical architecture,
'
Lessig proceeds to explain, consists of three essential "layers."121
Drawing upon
the work of Yochai Benkler, Lessig describes the layers as follows:
At the bottom is a "physical" layer, across which communication
bound by local anti-smoking ordinance); Hilands Golf Club v. Ashmore, 39 P.3d 697, 702 (Mont. 2002)
(holding private golf club cannot provide women with different membership than those provided
men).
116. See, e.g., Long v. Coast Resorts, Inc. 267 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding costs to hotel
of providing wheelchair access to disabled patrons no barrier to statutory compliance, and where no
special characteristics to the terrain exist, no such objection is permissible).
117. See supra notes 97-98 for a discussion of Carparts line of cases at federal appellate and
district court levels. Cf. Note, A Public Accommodation Challenge to the Use of Indian Team Names
and Mascots in ProfessionalSports, 112 HARV. L. REV. 904, 910 (1999) (finding that Title II of Civil

Rights Act of 1964 should be used to challenge the use of Indian monikers by professional sports
teams since, even though teams may not have specific physical location, "[a] professional sports team
... cannot function without a physical facility. A stadium and team are mutually interdependent.").
118. See LESSIG, supra note 10, at 156 (commenting on efforts of cable companies to restrict
"end-to-end" access); SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 88-101 (discussing efforts by Microsoft to dominate
consumer options); Lemley, supranote 47, at 1257 (advocating for public ordering of Internet).
119. LESSIG, supra note 10, at 15.
120. Id. at 23. It should be noted that Lessig's use of the word "commons" is a bit loose. He
seems to use the word as much in a hortatory, political sense, than as a term of art referring to a
collectively-shared resource.
121. Id. (explaining "the layers that I mean here are the different layers in a communications
system that together make communications possible").
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travels; this is the computer, or wires, that link computers on the
Internet. In the middle is a "logical" or "code" layer-the code that
makes the hardware run. Here we might include the protocols that
define the Internet and the software upon which those protocols run.
At the top is a "content" layer-the actual communications that get
said or transmitted across these wires. These three layers
function
1 22
together to define any particular communications system.
This three-tiered description of the Internet's structure provides a useful starting
point for a consideration of the practical and conceptual challenges facing the
suggestion that the Internet is a place of public accommodation.t 23 At every
stage, the balance to be struck is a familiar one: public access versus private
control. It is to each of these structural "layers," therefore, that I now turn. As
will be seen in the discussion that follows, as one ascends Lessig's structure from
the most physical to the most ephemeral, the difficulty of making a public
accommodation argument-at least in light of the post-Civil War common law
categories-becomes ever greater. The public accommodation argument is
considerably easier to make, however, if one conceives of it in terms of the preCivil War "duty to serve" rationale, a rationale that, arguably, is increasingly
reflected in today's understanding of accommodations questions-as for
example, in the ADA's extensive accommodation categories.
1. Physical Layer
Conceptually, the physical layer is the least problematic aspect of the
Internet in terms of public accommodation analysis. Computers are now widely
available and relatively inexpensive. Unless a particular manufacturer or
distributor discriminates against a class of persons in the sale or distribution of its
products, the need for a public accommodation claim is unlikely.
A
manufacturer who refuses to sell a computer or computer component would be
subject to a standard public accommodation claim in which a party's cause of
action arises from its exclusion from access to a physical place or the opportunity
to use and enjoy some physical good.1 24 Providing that the prospective buyer is
not a member of a protected class, inability to pay would constitute the sole
defense to such a claim.
The cables across which information travels, however, present a somewhat
more difficult case. Internet services are delivered across wire or cable like
telephone wire or electric or television cable, usually along granted easements.
Although judicial support for the unequal provision of such public services is

122. Id. See also LAWRENCE LESsIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999)
(exploring how code regulates cyberspace and effect on liberal ideals).
123. Surprisingly, many of those who have looked at the question of whether public
accommodation principles apply to cyberspace, at least in the disabilities rights context, limit their
analysis almost exclusively to consumer-ISP relations. See, e.g., Konkright, supra note 99, at 741-43
(discussing accessibility to "public accommodation" as Internet access provider issue).
124. The nature-and limits-of such claims are sketched in Singer, supra note 40, at 1286-1303,
1412-48.
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well established, 125 the basis for decision is not on public accommodation
grounds.
This is not to say, however, that there is no basis for applying public
accommodation principles to this feature of the Internet's physical structure. As
Singer explains, 18th century common lawyers, including notables from Lord
Holt 126 to Sir William Blackstone, t 27 considered the service obligations of those
engaged in "public employments" or "common callings.' 128 It would be
anachronistic to label these categories "public accommodations," and Singer
does not do so. His explication, however, suggests that these categories formed
the bases for modern notions of public accommodation.
What exactly
constitutes such a "public employment" or "common calling" is not crystal
clear.1 29 Nonetheless, the notions can be linked analytically in that, to be
embraced within one of these definitions, a business need not be a monopoly
whose smooth operation affects public service or that caters to the needs of
travelers. 130 On the contrary, what links the categories is that such businesses
131
"hold ... [themselves] out to the public."'

Singer further links the English common law "holding out" rationale to the
justifications offered for similar American decisions, some of them by celebrated
American jurists like Justice Story. 32
Taken together, these decisions
demonstrate "the most plausible construction of antebellum legal materials," a
construction that "would extend the right of access to all businesses that hold
themselves out as ready to serve the public."'1 33 The antebellum "right of access"
is thus roughly analogous to the modem "public accommodation" notion.
Implicitly, Singer links access and accommodation with an analysis of what
he calls the "distributive norms in current property law.' ' 134 Specifically, he
focuses on the notion of entitlement. He writes:
[B]y substituting the concept of "entitlement" for the concept of "title,"
we can better express the inherent distributive component of a private
property system and the defeasible quality of property rights. .

.

. The

entitlement idea brings within the property concept itself the notion that
property is a social system that organizes access to and control over valued
resources in order to create and maintain universal ability to obtain access

125. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, Mississippi, 437 F.2d 1286, 1292 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding
that unequal provision of municipal services to town's African-American residents violated
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection guarantee).
126. Singer, supranote 40, at 1305-06.
127. Id. at 1309-10.
128. Id. at 1305-10.
129. 1d. at 1304.
130. See supra note 40 for a discussion of typical rationales for the "innkeepers and common
carriers" exceptions to the right to exclude.
131. Singer, supra note 40, at 1318.
132. Id. at 1324.
133. Id. at 1331.
134. Id. at 1470-76.
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1 35

to the system by which property rights are acquired.
In the context of a public accommodations analysis reached in light of his
examination of the history of public accommodation law, Singer's conclusions
suggest that it is fully appropriate to conceptualize the Internet's physical layer
as a place of public accommodation. If, in light of both antebellum common law
and modern entitlement theory, the Internet's cables are viewed as instruments
that help organize questions of control and access-where access is a universal
value, as important as the potential to control property-then the cable portion
of the Internet's physical layer, created and maintained by businesses that "hold
themselves out as open to the public," reasonably should be subject to public
accommodation principles. For the cable provider, such a requirement would
demand little in practical terms. Legally, however, the provider would be
required to insure that individuals were not being excluded from information
traveling across their cables. To avoid liability, a cable provider thus might
require cable providers to resist efforts by code and content providers to act so
as to control access and thus exclude possible users.
2. Code Layer
By contrast to the physical layer, the code layer, which includes both the
technical protocols on which the Internet operates' 36 and the software that in
turn runs them, is not easily squared with a physicalized conception of "places"
137
of public accommodation, at least not at the most shallow level of analysis.
That is, computer engineers create the protocols, and software engineers design
the software that runs them. If a consumer tries to log onto a website, protocols
can prevent her from accessing the site or conducting a transaction there. The
protocols themselves, however, are not doing the excluding. To make a physical
analogy, a protocol is more like the physical doors and windows of a building
through which people may enter than it is like the merchandise and special
fittings, for example, that make a place a shoe store instead of a coffee shop.
And, just as doors and windows can be bolted to keep others out, protocolsrules-can be written to exclude, whether because the credit card of the person
seeking entry is invalid, or on the basis of some other status identification (the
failure to provide an institutional affiliation, for example). The point here is that
the ostensible form-whether it be physical architecture or technical architecture
in the form of code-can determine access and that it is essential to identify who
is making decisions to use that architecture to exclude, and why. Form is
dictated by substance or, to be more exact, by a substantive choice. As with a
building, someone both designs the protocol and monitors it or gives

135. Id. at 1473 (emphasis added).
See also JOSEPH W. SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE
PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 74 (2000) (discussing ways in which public accommodation laws limit, yet

create property rights).
136. See LESS1G, supra note 10, at 41 (suggesting that best known of such protocols are hypertext
transfer protocol ("http") or hypertext markup language ("html")).
137. Lessig, supra note 10, at 120-21(noting that cyberspace differs from reality because content
in cyberspace can be replicated instantaneously in many different places through use of code).
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responsibility to others to do so. Thus, when a protocol denies a person access to
a website, the exclusion is accomplished at someone's direction-the owner or
operator of a website and related business, for example-or perhaps by the
architect of the protocol herself.
The above analysis reveals the conceptual errors in ADA Title III cases
requiring discrimination at a fixed, physical "place" of public accommodation in
order to trigger liability. One line of such cases deals with insurance plans that
discriminate in their coverage with respect to disability. 138 When an insurance
plan is provided through an employer and is not directly solicited by an
individual, some courts have held that there can be no Title III violation. As the
most discussed of these cases held:
While we agree that an insurance office is a public accommodation as
expressly set forth in § 12181(7) [of the ADA], plaintiff did not seek
the goods and services of an insurance office. Rather, [plaintiff]
accessed a benefit plan provided by her private employer and issued by
[a private insurance company]. A benefit plan offered by 39
an employer
is not a good offered by a place of public accommodation.'
A problem with this reasoning, however, is that it artificially distinguishes
between form and substance. By concentrating on the form of the insurance
coverage transaction-here through the intermediary of an employer-the court
was able to find that the disabled individual whose coverage was limited by her
disability cannot claim Title III protection.
Not only is this reasoning highly artificial because it effectively precludes
coverage for the disabled individual seeking independent coverage will likely be
denied insurance for "pre-existing conditions," 14 0 it is artificial in the same way
that the post-Civil War narrowing of public accommodations principles was
artificial. That is, it justifies a result that runs contrary to the original substantive
intent of public accommodation law, which focused on the nature of the service
and, one might add, on the service relation between service provider and
consumer. The better analysis as applied to the Internet is found in that line of
cases holding that the nature of the service is the thing requiring public
protection, and not on the method of providing the service-whether in a
physical office, by phone, mail, or the Internet. 141 Such an analysis is consistent
138. See supra notes 97-98 for a discussion of these cases.
139. Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1010 (6th Cir. 1997).
140. See, e.g., Price v. Tanner, 855 F.2d 820, 824 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that where disability
occurred because of occupational aggravation of pre-existing condition, state law limiting recovery was
not unconstitutional). But see 26 U.S.C. § 833(c)(3)(iv) (West 2002) (requiring that Blue Shield and
Blue Cross organizations not discriminate in coverage provision on basis of pre-existing conditions).
141. As the Carpartscourt observed: "It would be irrational to conclude that persons who enter
an office to purchase services are protected by the ADA, but persons who purchase the same services
over the telephone or by mail are not. Congress could not have intended such an absurd result."
Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir.
1994). Even Judge Posner, the author of two decisions adhering to Parker'sphysicalized conception of
the term place of public accommodation, wrote of 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2003), the ADA Title III's
public accommodation provision, as follows:
[Tihe core meaning of this provision, plainly enough, is that the owner or operator of a store,
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with the earlier common law "duty to serve" rationale.
Nonetheless, many courts insist on a demonstrated physical connection to
an accommodation, typically labeling this a "nexus" requirement. 142 A failure to
establish "a nexus between southwest.com and a physical, concrete place of
public accommodation" was, for example, a central ground upon which a federal
district court rejected the inaccessibility claims brought by blind plaintiffs against
Southwest Airlines under the ADA. 143 The court's analysis reveals, however,
the analytical weakness of a "nexus" requirement. The district court relied upon
dicta of the 11th Circuit in which the appellate court observed that a Title III
claim requires a demonstrated "nexus between the challenged service and the
premises of the public accommodation." 144 In fact, however, in the decision
stating that requirement, the 11th Circuit found that the plaintiffs, disabled
individuals who could not compete in a telephone selection process for a game
show, had stated a claim for public accommodation under ADA Title III,
inasmuch as the game show to which the telephone lines were connected was
conducted in a "concrete [place, namely the] television studio. ' 145 By contrast,
the district court in the Southwest Airlines case concluded, relying upon dicta in
another United States Supreme Court case, that the southwest.com website was
"located in no particular geographical location but available to anyone,
anywhere in the world."'

146

The weakness of the reasoning here is that the website is possible, of course,
only because of codes that have been programmed from a place. That is, it is
hard to understand why a television station is more "concrete" than a corporate
office where the particular form of website is developed and authorized. In
47
other words, the "nexus" concept is so malleable as to be rather meaningless.
Moreover, this point underscores a central concern of this article, namely that
questions of Internet access, and specifically of public accommodation in
cyberspace, need to look as much at the purpose of public accommodation
hotel, restaurant, dentist's office, travel agency, theater, Web site, or other facility whether in
physical space or in electronicspace [Carpartscite omitted] that is open to the public cannot
exclude disabled persons from entering the facility and, once in, from using the facility in the
same way that the nondisabled do.
Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).
142. See Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 33 n.3 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing nexus
requirement); cf. Andrew M. Perlman, Public Accommodation Laws and the Dual Nature of the

Freedom of Association, 8 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RrS. L.J. 111, 124 (1998) (stating that "the ultimate
question should be whether an organization provides the kinds of goods, services, or advantages that

give public accommodation statutes their value").
143. Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2002)
(quoting Voyeur Dorm, L.C. v. City of Tampa, 265 F.3d 1232, 1237 n.3 (11th Cir. 2001)).
144. Id. at 1321 n.1l.
145. Id. at 1321.
146. Id. (quoting Voyeur Dorm, 265 F.3d at 1237 n.3 (quoting Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union,
521 U.S. 844,851 (1997))).
147. Cf.Anita Ramasastry, The Americans With DisabilitiesAct in Cyberspace:Should Web-Only
Businesses Be Required to be DisabledAccessible?, availableat http://writ.findlaw.com/ramasastry/2002

1106.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2002) (arguing ADA applies to websites).
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principles as at the physical characteristic of the allegedly discriminatory entity.
If, for instance, one applies Singer's "duty to serve" rationale, there is no basis
for distinguishing between telephonic exclusion from a television game show
pool and Internet exclusion from a corporate website, since both are offered to
the public as goods or services.
Another line of relevant ADA Title III cases adhering to a physicalized
conception of public accommodation law, this time alleging discrimination by
sports organizations that have no fixed place of business, repeats the artificial
distinctions of the insurance cases. 148 Consider, for example, the claim of
hearing-impaired individuals who sought access to special decoding technology
for National Football League games that were "blacked-out" and would not be
televised locally (because the games were not sold out) and so could not be
enjoyed by hearing-impaired individuals. 14 9 The court in that case found that
even though hearing-enabled persons could listen to radio broadcasts
unavailable to the hearing impaired, there was no discrimination for Title III
purposes because both hearing and hearing-impaired persons were denied the
opportunity to enjoy the televised games. 150 In reaching this conclusion, the
court maintained that:
[tihe televised broadcast of football games is certainly offered through
defendants, but not as a service of public accommodation. It is all of
the services which the public accommodation offers, not all services
which the lessor of the public accommodation offers which fall within
the scope of Title III ....

Although a game is played in a "place of

public accommodation" and may be viewed on television in another
"place of public accommodation," that does not suffice [to make the
151
game itself a public accommodation].
Much like the post-Civil War narrowing of the duty to serve for entities that hold
themselves out to the public, such a case has the effect of appearing to exclude
on equal bases while in fact assuring discrimination against a specific group of
individuals. That is, because of the decision to focus on physical location,
hearing-impaired persons who could neither enjoy a game by buying a ticket nor

148. See supra note 109 and accompanying text for a discussion of suits by disabled golfers
against the Professional Golfers Association.

149. See Stoutenborough v. Nat'l Football League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580, 582 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding
NFL's blackout rule not discriminatory because it applies equally to hearing-impaired and hearing
populations); see also Matthews v. Nat'l Coll. Athletic Ass'n, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1204 (E.D.Wa. 1999)
(finding that NCAA is not place of public accommodation because it is not affiliated with specific
public place); cf Neff v. Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d 1063, 1069 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that

wheelchair-bound woman cannot sue franchiser Dairy Queen for failure of its franchisee to
accommodate her because parent is not an "operator" under the ADA); Clegg v. Cult Awareness
Network, 18 F.3d 752, 756 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding church member barred from membership in Cult
Awareness Network chapter does not have claim under Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964 because not
affiliated with public facility or place); Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1269 (7th Cir. 1993)
(rejecting claim under Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964 that Boy Scouts can be an "establishment"
that "serves the public" as a membership organization).
150. Stoutenborough, 59 F.3d at 582.
151. Id. at 583.
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by watching its televised or radio broadcast forms are effectively excluded from
the activity.
Courts in other sports association cases, however, have found that
organizational control and not physical location classifies an entity as a public
accommodation. In these cases, the courts focus on the connection between the
organization and the location of the facilities where its teams play to guard
against discrimination on public accommodation grounds.152 Thus, like the
antebellum common law duty to serve, these cases look to the purpose of the
accommodation principle, which is to guarantee a right of access. This approach
could usefully be applied to regulation of the code layer as a place of public
accommodation-inasmuch as code protocols and the software used to run them
are held out for public consumption. Following the antebellum common law
duty to serve, it is not the place of service that matters as much as the fact that
the service is offered to the public. 153 Thus, it is appropriate to conceptualize the
Internet's code layer as a public accommodation, even if the code itself is not a
fixed physical place. 154 Accordingly, as with the physical layer, what is needed is
to open a discussion about the public accommodations duties of those associated
with the code layer. In light of the foregoing analysis, a possible criterion for
applying public accommodation principles to this layer of the Internet would be
to examine the nature of the enterprise. Thus, for example, if the owners of the
code held themselves out to the public, they would have to do so in a nondiscriminatory manner. That is, their code would have to assure a predetermined, minimum degree of access for all, and no exclusion of a person or
persons for discriminatory reasons. The same logic might be extended to
computer or software engineers, to the extent that their work prevented the
targeted, discriminatory exclusion of some individual or group of persons from
some part of cyberspace.
Thus, for example, it might be appropriate under a rewritten federal public
accommodation law to find an ISP liable when it failed to take action against the
perpetrators of religiously-based harassment in an Internet chat room, 5 5 or to
assess liability against the designer of a commercial airline's website when that

152. Tatum v. Nat'l Coll. Athletic Ass'n, 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1121 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (holding that
NCAA operates as place of public accommodation, and distinguishing from cases looking at
organizations as organizations rather than operators of facilities); Bowers v. Nat'l Coll. Athletic Ass'n,
118 F. Supp. 2d 494, 516-17 (D.N.J. 2000) (finding that NCAA is an operator of public accommodation
since more done than regulating eligibility of college athletes).
153. Singer, supra note 40, at 1292 (stating prior to Civil War all business holding themselves out
as open to the public were likely required "to serve anyone who sought service").
154. This article does not deal with an important issue raised by my suggestion that U.S. public
accommodation law should reach such places, namely the fact that some of the places referred to here
will inevitably exist outside U.S. territorial jurisdiction. See Cockfield, supra note 32, at 1202-06 for a
discussion of concerns about applying territorial-based rules in an international context and the limits
of this approach for Internet regulations.
155. Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 542 (E.D. Va. 2003) (finding ISP not
public accommodation and AOL had no Title II obligation to prevent discrimination on basis of
religion).
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156
website failed to provide facilities for blind patrons to access its website.

3. Content Layer
As Lessig explains, the Internet's "content" layer refers to "the actual stuff
that gets transmitted or said across the wires." 157 At its most extreme, if I were
to argue here that all content should be deemed a place of public
accommodation, I would be arguing for social ownership of all information,
which would render meaningless the notion of public accommodation because
the "public" adjective suggests that some property remain "private" and not
accommodate the public. The actual content, after all, is the value that
individuals have to offer-again, following Lessig: "digital images, texts, on-line
movies, and the like." 158 If these types of content were all deemed equally
consumable by all without respect to some ordering principle (such as the ability
or willingness to pay), the incentives for organizations to provide a wide array of
services on the Internet would doubtless sharply decrease. Similarly, the claim
that all content should be deemed a place of public accommodation would
almost certainly run afoul of constitutional free speech and association
protections, since it would rob individuals of an important medium for personal
expression and communication.
Yet as the earlier examples suggest, it is not the mere willingness and/or
ability to pay that may be most problematic in cyber-exclusion. 5 9 On the
contrary, exclusion on the basis of ability to pay and on the basis of something
else-personal history, past or present employment, or, conceivably, some other
personal characteristic or status-is what is most troubling about cyberexclusion. Therefore, what is required is at a minimum to establish a limited
right of access for all online content-at least to the extent that access is
permitted by statute or common law in real space.
It is worth adding that the market has devised ways to provide access but
also to limit copying, a concern of many scholars of Internet law in the not so
distant past. 160 Websites offering pictures and other visual information for sale,
for instance, now routinely insert blocks that preserve copyright and prevent
unauthorized copying while also making full access possible for the curious or for
those willing to pay for the product. 161 Such a development assures the
156. Access Now, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1321 (holding that there is no Title II ADA claim when
airline's website inaccessible to blind because no nexus between online website and physical location

of public accommodation).
157. LESSIG, supra note 10, at 23.
158. Id.
159. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of exclusion from cyberspace
on the basis of a tendency toward private control and a favoring of the economically mighty.
160. See, e.g., Hardy, supra note 12, at 1030-31 (discussing contract approach to limiting copying
on the Internet); Johnson and Post, supra note 32, at 1385 n.39 (noting impossibility of surfing net
without copying); see also Pamela Samuelson, et al., Toward a Third Intellectual Property Paradigm:
Article: a Manifesto Concerning The Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
2308, 2356 (1994) (discussing under and overprotection of traditional regulations).
161. See, e.g., Hal R. Varian, New Chips Can Keep a Tight Rein on Consumers, Even After They
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possibility of access that is both profitable and non-exclusive.
The question then becomes how best to guarantee that all individuals have
access to the content and are not discriminated against in their efforts to gain
access to content. Likely, the most costly manner in which such access will be
provided is providing access for persons with disabilities. Federal agencies,
however, have produced detailed guidelines requiring that such services be
provided. 162 In other words, there exists strong evidence of some high degree of
163
social consensus for bearing such costs.
Similarly, it merits considering the extension of such prohibitions on
exclusion for another reason. Particularly with the growth of e-technologies that
will, for instance, authenticate signatures,1 64 it is imperative that persons not be
excluded from any aspect of Internet use or access because they could not

similarly authenticate that they do not belong to a particular race, gender,
political party, or any other group determined to merit special protection. The
Internet is a powerful tool for establishing social connection but, as recent
political events have reminded us, it is also a forum for fomenting parochial
hatreds across wide distances.1 65 As a matter of law, policy, and common
practice, assuring the primacy of some public role on the Internet-by means of
the operation of the public accommodation laws-is essential to foster the

development of the Internet's desirable and benign aspects, as opposed to its

Buy a Product, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2002, at C2 (examining vulnerabilities to computer copying
copyright laws); see also LESSIG, supra note 10, at 150, 172-73 (discussing ways to control network and
establish new norms on Internet and analyzing development of firewall technology); William W.
Fisher III, Propertyand Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI-KENT. L. REV. 1203, 1255 (1998) (proposing
use of encryption technologies to insure default entitlements); I. Trotter Hardy, Property (and
Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 236 (1996) (addressing likelihood that future
technology will make it easier to draw and monitor boundaries in cyberspace).
162. FederalWebsites Face Redesign to Accommodate the Disabled,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22,2000, at
A18 (describing effects to make federal websites more accessible for disabled).
163. And at least with respect to the design of websites, the costs arguably will not be
overwhelming. See McKee and Fleischaker, supra note 35, at 36 for a description of initiatives to
prevent website owners and designers from incurring costs in making their websites accessible to the
disabled.
164. See, e.g., Tzong-Sun Wu & Chien-Lung Hsu, Convertible Authenticated Encryption Scheme,
62 J. SYS. & SOFTWARE 205211, 2002 WL 16730367 (2002) (describing "digital signatures" and
signature verification technology).
165. Andrew Higgins, How al Qaeda PutInternet in Service of Global Jihad,WALL ST. J. Nov. 11,
2002, at Al, col. 1; James Risen & David Johnston, Agency Is Under Scrutiny For Overlooked
Messages, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2002, at A20, col. 5 (asserting that cryptic Internet messages possibly
referring to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were intercepted by National Security Administration
immediately prior to attacks); David Johnston, et al., Qaeda's New Links Increase Threats From FarFlung Sites, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, Al (commenting on terror network's use of electronic
networks to try and regroup its forces). See also Netanel, supra note 73, at 449-500 (discussing U.S.
law's historical resistance to self-governance and suggesting that reasons for such hostility are also
applicable to cyberspace); Jason Krause, Taking Aim at Cybersecurity, ABA JOURNAL E-REP., Feb.
15, 2002, available at http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/fl5cyber.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2003)
(addressing formation of Cybersecurity Privacy Task Force, an organization created in response to
events of September 1 10, 2001, formed for purpose of studying Patriot Act and how statute has
changed landscape for lawyers).
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more insidious ones. 166 A right of access, because it promotes the values of
transparency and equal opportunity of use, would reinforce the Internet's more
socially useful aspects. For the content layer, as with the physical and code
layers, this right of access can be assured in a relatively straightforward manner.
What is required is to initiate a public conversation about the extent of the
popular right of access to cyber-content, defining clearly the degree of openness
required when a party offers its content to the public. In addition, it is essential
to provide legislative guarantees that no individual can be denied access to
cyber-content on the basis of membership in a protected class. As a result, the
logic advanced here suggests, for instance, that an airline should be held liable
who were unable to
for failing to provide special facilities for blind persons
167
access the airline's website because of their disability.
In this connection, it is worth stressing-although I cannot resolve it herea particular concern in cyberspace, namely discrimination on the basis of
economic status.
Income is never a protected class in U.S. public
accommodation law and one of-perhaps the-distinguishing feature of Internet
1 68
As the digital divide 169
access is that "accessing the Internet requires money."
continues to become evermore apparent, its growth may demand re-thinking the
very categories meriting designated public accommodation protection. In
particular, should income discrimination become a proxy for racial or other
forms of discrimination, 170 disentangling public accommodation discrimination
based on one or another factor may prove insurmountably difficult in
cyberspace, in turn necessitating our wholesale revision of the agreed-upon
categories for designated public accommodation protection.
C. Overcoming the Conceptual Challenges
Some will likely protest that the Internet is empirically different from other
goods and services we obtain and use. The extent of this difference, they will
likely contend, precludes classifying cyberspace as subject to public
accommodation principles.
1. Digital Cable Comparison
The nature of this concern is reflected in a case considering facts from a
related technological area, namely the provision of digital cable television.

166. See LESSlG, supra note 10, at 14 (exploring whether and how Internet as resource should be
controlled); Lemley, supra note 47, at 1260-61 (advocating public ordering on Internet while
recognizing benefits of private ordering).
167. Access Now, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1319 (recognizing plaintiffs argument that Title II of
ADA mandated airlines' website be accessible).
168. See Ku, supranote 59, at 324 (discussing digital divide).
169. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the digital divide.
170. Ku notes that the "digital divide separates real space from cyberspace based upon race,
income, education, and geography." Ku, supra note 59, at 91. See also supra notes 35-45 and
accompanying text for a discussion of public access laws throughout history.
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Torres v. AT&T Broadband 71 illustrates the difficulty that the argument
advanced in this paper is likely to meet in the courts. Torres involved a claim by
a visually-impaired digital cable television subscriber under the ADA.
Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that defendants, providers of digital cable
television, were "required to make the channel on which the defendants provide
a list of available programs ('the channel menu') accessible to the visually
t72
impaired" under the public accommodation provisions of the ADA.
The "contention that digital cable services constitute a place of public
accommodation is contrary to the plain language of the statute and its
implementing regulations," said Judge Breyer of the Northern District of
California, insisting that "the plaintiff's home cannot reasonably be classified as
a place of public exhibition or entertainment. ' 173 This is because, the court
further explained, "[t]he defendants' digital cable system cannot be considered a
facility, because in no way does viewing the system's images require the plaintiff
to gain access to any actual physical public place.' 74 The court thus firmly (if
implicitly) came down on the side of the ADA Title III insurance cases that
175
insist upon a physicality requirement for public accommodation laws to apply.
The modern law of public accommodation provides the basis for
understanding this decision's antiquated reasoning. To be exact, the decision
focuses on a physicality requirement that fails to appreciate the dramatic changes
in the provision of entertainment and in all manner of business communication,
as well as the delivery of goods and services in the last generation. That is, why
can't a person's home "reasonably" be considered a place of exhibition and
entertainment? 176 The technology of, for example, a big-screen television

171. 158 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
172. Torres, 158 F. Supp. 2d at 1036.
173. Id. at 1037-38 (emphasis added).
174. Id. at 1038 (citing Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1114-16 (9th
Cir. 2000)).
175. See supra note 97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the split among courts as to
whether a physical presence is required for a group to qualify as a public accommodation under the
ADA. Curiously, however, the Torres court did not cite those cases, relying instead only on a case
from within the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in which a Hollywood movie studio was not found to
offer public accommodations to a disabled person who on a limited number of occasions had been
granted access to studio facilities. See Torres, 158 F. Supp. 2d at 1038 (citing Weyer, 198 F.3d at 111416 (holding that place of public accommodation necessitates good or service provided on actual
physical premises)); see also Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1114-16 (holding that term "place of public
accommodation" suggests necessity of good or service provided in actual physical premises).
176. A relevant analogy comes from the erratic United States Supreme Court jurisprudence on
the "public-ness" of privately-owned shopping malls. See, e.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551,
570 (1972) (holding no First Amendment right to distribute handbills in a privately-owned shopping
mall); cf Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (stating state constitutional
provisions allowing free speech exercise in publicly-owned shopping centers did not constitute federal
constitutional violation). State courts have often worked, relying largely on state law, to distinguish
their results from the Lloyd Corp. result. See, e.g., Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. Local Joint
Executive Bd. of Las Vegas, 257 F.3d 937, 947 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that although formerly public
sidewalk was now part of private casino resort, it still must be accessible to public and was thus
distinguishable from Lloyd); N.J. Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp.,
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certainly suggests that Judge Breyer is quite wrong about this. The statute, after
all, says nothing about "paid" exhibition or entertainment. 177 This begs the
question: if an individual desires to participate in a public event such as a
heavyweight boxing title fight that is available for viewing only in Las Vegas or
in one's home on a pay-per-view basis, how is the home not rendered a place of
public exhibition? The viewer is, after all, enjoying a public spectacle in real
time, although in his own home. As usual, the court's choice of adverb-the
lawyer's ultimate weasel word, "reasonably"-provides the clue that the result is
far less clear cut than the court's opinion so confidently suggests.
Indeed, the slipperiness of the court's use of the word "reasonable" is
revealed by precedent from within its own circuit. Judge Breyer neglected a case
involving public accommodation claims under Title II of the Civil Rights Act
that might have led him to an opposite result. United States v. Baird178 held that
the intimidation of an African-American man in the parking lot of a retail
convenience store violated the public accommodations provisions of Title II
because the store leased two video game machines for use by patrons. 179 As the
appellate court observed:
[a] place where people play video games differs from a "motion picture
house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium" in that the player
generally acts alone rather than sitting with a crowd, and actively
creates his own entertainment by putting money in the machine and
manipulating the machine, rather than sitting in a crowd and watching
other people. Nevertheless, it is a "place of entertainment" because
people play video games in order to amuse themselves and pass the
time agreeably. The evil addressed by the statute, in this instance, is
segregation of places to which people resort for entertainment. People
go to 80and remain in stores that have video games in order to play
them.
A striking feature of the above analysis is the circuit court's focus on the
nature of the service. In Baird, what appears, as much as anything, to make the
area around a pay-to-play video game machine a place of public accommodation
is the fact that the machine has been offered to members of the public, for a fee,
for their private enjoyment. This appears to be so despite the solitariness of the
entertainment and despite even the place it occurred. As a justification for a
public accommodation finding, this is not a far cry from the antebellum
justification that deemed a business as having a duty to serve all who chose to
take advantage of the service it offered.
Furthermore, it is arguably incorrect to assert, as Judge Breyer did, that

650 A.2d 757, 750 (N.J. 1994) (finding that N.J. Constitution extends protection of speech to private
property); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUcTION To PROPERTY § 2.7.2 (2001) (surveying state
court efforts to distinguish cases from Lloyd).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C) (2000).
178. 85 F.3d 450 (9th Cir. 1996). See generally supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the broad reading of public accommodation statutes.
179. Baird,85 F.3d at 454.
180. Id. at 453 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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access to a public, physical place is required in.order to trigger the reach of ADA
Title III. This relies on a rather arbitrary distinction between what is "public"
and what is "private.' 18' In fact, the statute says that private entities may be
considered public accommodations "if the operations of such entities affect
commerce."182 Focus on the "affecting commerce" requirement helps direct
attention to the new technology aspect of the Torres facts that the court
overlooked. Unlike the advertising-based provider-consumer relation existing
before cable television, fee-based cable television today is quite different. That
is, advertisements do not pay for the service-subscribers do. Thus, the payment
of monthly (and often additional) charges, depending on the nature of the
service, certainly "affect commerce" and so should be enough to trigger ADA
183
Title III coverage.
This is particularly true if, to borrow from the analysis of the Internet that
preceded the discussion in this subsection, one focuses on connection to a
physical place. The cable company provided a service from a physical place-the
physical layer. Its technology made possible the delivery of content-the
equivalent of the code layer in the cyber-example. Finally, the content was
received-usually by means of a special, provider-supplied device-into the
place it was to be used. In short, by focusing on the physicality of the chain of
connection, rather than the physical place itself, it is fully appropriate to apply a
public accommodations analysis to cable television as well as to the Internet.
2. Utility Comparison
The provision of utility services provides another example. Like the
Internet, a utility-electricity or water, for instance-is provided to individual
consumers, both commercial and residential. The good moves from one physical
location and is transmitted through an infrastructure-one usually provided and
maintained by the utility itself-for delivery in the home of the consumer.
Although not typically classed as "public accommodations," it is striking to
note a public utility code speaking of the obligations of utility providers to
accommodate their customers. 184 In other words, utility law focuses on the

181. Opportunistic manipulation of the public/private distinction has, of course, a venerable
history in U.S. property law. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property,86 Nw. U. L.
REV 1, 5 (1991) (discussing manipulation of the public/private distinction in native lands context).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2002).
183. Id. (declaring that certain private entities are considered public accommodations if they
affect commerce). This requirement mirrors that of other public accommodation statutes. See, e.g.,
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1999) (including establishments affecting
interstate commerce as public accommodation).
184. Bellotti v. Duquesne Light Co., 44 Pa. D. & C. 3d 425, 428-29 (Pa. C. P. 1987) (quoting 66
PA. CONS. STAT. § 1501 (1978)). Stating in pertinent part:
Every public utility shall furnish and maintain adequate, efficient, safe, and reasonable
service and facilities, and shall make all such repairs, changes, alterations, substitutions,
extensions, and improvements in or to such service and facilities as shall be necessary or
proper for the accommodation, convenience, and safety of its patrons, employees and the
public.
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nature of the service, and not on the private, public or quasi-private and/or
quasi-public character of the entity. A focus on the nature of the service, and the
agreed-upon social goal of providing that service on an equal basis, necessitates
conceptualizing of service provision as carrying a duty that it be provided equally
to all patrons.
3. The Credit Access Comparison
Similar arguments can be made with respect to the provision of credit.
Although "[t]raditionally, credit has not been thought to fit into the category of
public accommodations.... access to lending institutions and the services they
provide is most assuredly an access right of as great significance as admission to
restaurants, hotels, and theaters." 185 For this reason, numerous federal and state
laws have been enacted to assure consumer provision of credit. With the
expansion of online credit services, 18 6 it becomes more important than ever to
focus on the nature of the service rather than on the place it is provided.
Suppose, for instance, that an individual is unable to apply for a mortgage
because he is sight-impaired and cannot read the mortgage comparison charts.
Or suppose that an African-American living in a largely African-American
neighborhood accesses the online mortgage provider from her home computer,
types in her zip code, and is told that the provider does not service that zip code.
Suppose further that either or both of these individuals were able to determine,
through the use of trial and error, that surrounding zip codes in their city or zip
codes inhabited overwhelmingly by either the sight-enabled or by white,
European-Americans, are serviced by the online mortgage service. In either of
the above examples, it would not only be appropriate, but also fully consistent
with the trend of modern public accommodations law, to find that the failure to
accommodate the disabled or racial minority consumers would constitute a
violation of that law. This would be so even though there was no "public"
physical location from which the hypothetical consumer was excluded, if
"public" is understood to refer to a place outside of one's "private" home or
business. But if one focuses on the public-ness of the nature of the service,
187
application of accommodation principles is far less problematic.

Id.
See also Singer, supra note 40, at 1319, 1401-11 (finding common law judgment that "common
employments" had duty to serve and surveying theories concerning public obligations of public service
companies). In the antebellum United States, a rationale like the duty to serve applied to "[p]ublic
utility companies, such as gas companies, [who] were similarly required to serve the public because of
their 'exclusive privileges."' Id.
185. Project Discrimination in Access to Public Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public
Accommodation Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 215, 235 (1978). In the nearly 25 years
since this survey was conducted, not much has changed. Lending institutions were not included, for
instance, in the list of public accommodations that appears in the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2003).
186. See, e.g., http://www.mortgageexpo.com (last visited Sept. 13, 2003) (providing online
mortgage comparison shopping).
187. This is an especially troublesome issue in the case of Internet banks. For example, the
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (1997) requires banks to lend
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IV. FUTURE REGULATION OF THE INTERNET AS A PLACE OF PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATION

Much of this article has been concerned with establishing that, despite
appearances, there is a "there" there for the Internet. In fact, as I have aimed to
suggest, there are many "theres." It is not sufficient, however, simply to say that
at every level-physical, code and content-for all purposes and at all times, that
the Internet is a place of public accommodation. 8 8 On the contrary, to complete
the argument advanced here, it is necessary to identify the principles that should
guide a consideration of cyberspace as a place of public accommodation. In so
doing, the aim is to insure open access to the Internet for all personsrecognizing, importantly, that "open" does not, and cannot, mean "unrestricted"
for all purposes.
Those who worry about excessive control of Internet resources by a limited
number of individuals and institutions 89 may find comfort with a conception of
property rights that admits of simultaneous, competing interests in property. In
other words, the proverbial "bundle of sticks" metaphor may help diffuse the
anxiety of analysts like Lessig about the fight for cyber-control.
Consider, by way of example, this concern of Lessig's, where he examines
the consequence of changes to "the broadband environment" and "spectrum
rules" in cyberspace:
[a]nd in each [of these examples], the idea about property prevails. We
race to empower networks to discriminate (after all, they are "their
computers"); we race to empower owners of copyright to control new
modes of distribution; we race to develop property in the air. Our
single, overriding view of the world is that only property matters; our
systematic blindness is to the lesson of our tradition-that property
flourishes best in an environment of freedom, both freedom from state
control and freedom from private control. 1Well, maybe. It all depends on exactly what is meant by "control." If by control

money to borrowers within their "community." Regulations issued pursuant to the CRA have
attempted to define "community," and set standards for the percentages of outstanding loans that
should go to borrowers within that "community." See, e.g., Thomas W. Beetham, Note, The
Community Reinvestment Act and Internet Banks: Redefining the Community, 39 B.C. L. REV. 911,
915-16 (1998) (outlining regulations promulgated by Office of Comptroller of the Currency, the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, The Federal Depository Insurance Corporation, and the
Office of Thrift Supervision). But, for instance, the "community" in which an Internet bank is
obligated to lend determined by its physical headquarters or by the places where it does business,
which may have insignificant connection to that physical location? See id. at 927-28 (arguing Internet
banking encourages CRA focus on equality of access to banking services rather than physical
geography); Miho Kubota, Note: Encouraging Community Development in Cyberspace: Applying the
Community Reinvestment Act to Internet Banks, 5 B.U. J. ScI. & TECH. L. 8, 40 (1999) (proposing new
CRA should define internet bank's community as national in scope).
188. As noted supra Section II.C.1, First Amendment interests of free speech and truly private
associations would, for instance, have to be recognized.
189. See LESSIG, supra note 10, at 236 (warning that traditionally open resources of Internet are
increasingly controlled by smaller number of people).
190. Id.
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one means a choice between nationalization (on the state side of the ledger) or
corporate monopoly (on the private side of that same ledger), as Lessig seems to
do in the language quoted above, he may be right.
But there also is "control" that provides guarantees of limited rights-such
as control by means of public accommodation laws-and there is "control" in the
form of a tight stranglehold over the widespread provision of goods and services
by either the state or by a private corporation. The latter form of "control,"
necessitated by an unyielding, absolutist use of the word "property," is what
Lessig seems to envision at either end of the public/private divide. In an effort to
suggest, therefore, that while concerns about the loss of open access and
resultant discrimination in cyberspace are real but nonetheless remediable, this
article now turns to consider the appropriate scope of Internet regulation as a
place of public accommodation.
An invaluable first step in finding the appropriate balance between public
and private interests in cyberspace can be achieved by recognizing the
applicability of "real" property principles, and specifically public accommodation
principles, to cyber-realty.19' As noted at the outset of this article, to do so
responds to the ways in which we seem inclined-our metaphoric predisposition,
if you like-to conceptualize the Internet, as a space, as cyberplace.
In service of the regulation of the Internet as cyberplace, the remainder of
this Part is divided into two principal sections. The first, more theoretical
section, examines the argument that the Internet is a place of public
accommodation in light of contemporary property scholarship. As this first
section suggests, different strands of contemporary property scholarshipincluding commons analysis and a body of writing that endeavors to describe the
complicated character of the thing we understand as "property"-support a
finding that public accommodation principles should properly be applied to
Internet regulation. The section that follows links the theoretical and practical
goals of that scholarship with the earlier part of this article, notably the sections
laying out the antebellum view of a "duty to serve" when an entity makes its
goods and services available to the public. In sum, the aim of this Part is to
demonstrate that modern property scholarship in fact redirects our attention to
the validity and appropriateness of a broad definition of "public
accommodation," one that should include the Internet's several layers.
A. Property Principlesand the Closing of the Electronic Frontier
As noted previously, many Internet commentators fear the growing
contractualization of Internet interaction, such as the increasing dependence on
licensing agreements as a means of asserting control.' 92 In the face of this
development, numerous commentators have advanced pleas for a return-or at
least of a partial preservation of-the halcyon days of the early Internet, when

191. And thus, I suggest, to cyber-reality.
192. See Samuelson, supra note 85, at 113 (discussing property rights approach to control of data
collected on Internet).
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code was always open and the aim of the Internet was to allow information to be
shared.' 93 This is Lessig's desire, for instance, when he makes his case that "[w]e
therefore should move-as quickly as possible-to a regime where the right to
1 94
innovate does not depend on the permission of someone else."

Recognizing, however, that increased regulation of cyberspace is inevitable,
some of these same commentators have argued that the answer is private
ordering and norm creation with limited government oversight. 195 Still others
have suggested that the government should take a more extensive role, perhaps
by restricting Internet licensing. 196 Lessig, more utopian than most, continues to
hearken back to the kinder, gentler rule of "open access," pleading for a
minimum of control by either the state or by private interests. Thus, he laments
of:

a blindness that affects our political culture generally. We have been
so captured by the ideals of property and control that we don't even
see the benefits from resources not perfectly controlled. Resistance to
property is read as an endorsement of the state. The challenge to
is read as the endorsement of
extreme
propertization
t
nationalization. 97
This article has aimed to reinforce the view, however, that the "ideal" of
property is more than a libertarian notion of property and the control that notion
entails. Lessig's use of the word in the just-quoted language seems to envision

193. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 10, at 100-08 (noting that "[o]penness not property or contract
but free code and access - created the boom that gave birth to the Internet that we now know. And it
was this boom that then attracted the attention of commerce. With all this activity, commerce rightly
reasoned, surely there was money to be made."); see also PAULINA BORSOOK, CYBERSELFISH: A
CRITICAL ROMP THROUGH THE TERRIBLY LIBERTARIAN CULTURE OF HIGH-TECH 1-27, 73-114

(2000) (describing strong anti-government bias of hard-core "cyberpunks"); ESTHER DYSON,
RELEASE 2.0: A DESIGN FOR LIVING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 103-04 (1997) (advocating minimal
government intervention in Internet regulation and "privatizing government").
194. LESSIG, supra note 10, at 221.

195. See, e.g., Hardy, supra note 12, at 252-53 (claiming efficiencies of "private property"
regulation); Hardy, supra note 12, at 1054 (arguing for "presumption of decentralization" in Internet
regulation); Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations,84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1303 (1996) (arguing for cyber-regulation by
working from background property rule entitlements to create collective-and private-"private
liability rule" organizations instead of government-controlled compulsory licensing); Post and
Johnson, supra note 32, at 1370-76 (asserting cyber-exceptionalism and seeking private ordering of
cyberspace). But see Cohen, supra note 47, at 480-84 (criticizing what she calls the "cybereconomists"
desire to privatize control over digital works); Lemley, supra note 47, at 1287-94 (reluctantly
concluding that public rather than private ordering of the Internet is best); Netanel, supra note 73, at
410-12 (arguing that private ordering in cyberia can threaten liberal democracy and so government
regulation, albeit narrowly circumscribed regulation, is best); Radin, supra note 15, at 525 (questioning
result of different normative regimes in cyberspace, including open network, self-regulation and an
increased government role); Margaret Jane Radin and R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering:
Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1295. 1295 (1998) (discussing
relevance of legal realist and critical legal studies critiques of unmerited persistence of laissez-faire
ideology in U.S. law).
196. Samuelson, supra note 85, at 1173 (advocating "modified licensing regime" in cyberspace).
197. LESSIG, supra note 10, at 237.
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the sort of free wheeling, libertarian justifications for property associated with
the likes of Milton Friedman and Frederick Hayek, advocates of what has been
labeled "the power-spreading argument." 198 This is, however, but one of many
possible property narratives, each of which can be told in countless
permutations.' 99 If one insists on a less unitary, more complicated and multidimensional notion of property than Lessig seems to do, his anxiety begins to
seem just a tad overwrought, and maybe even premature.
In the face of the private fight for control of cyberspace by contract,
government regulation of cyberspace also will continue to expand. 2°° It is not
the aim of this article to draw the exact boundaries for such government
involvement. It is to argue that, when Internet access is precluded for any
reason, it is essential not to exclude citizens and potential consumers ex ante and
to insist upon reasoned deliberation as to the terms on which all potential
Internet users will be guaranteed access. Otherwise, it seems likely that contract
rights will be used to secure strong property rights of a highly individualistic sort.
This could lead, in turn, to undesirable concentrations of information and, hence,
economic power. If history is a reliable guide, particular classes of persons will
then be excluded from sharing in that information. 20 1 However, a broad range of
scholarship provides direction for ways to avoid excessive concentrations of
information and power. The first useful body of scholarship is commons
analysis; the second argues for a complicated, multi-faceted understanding of the
term "property."
1. A Role for Commons Analysis
While some are perhaps too ready to see the adoption of Internet norms
that leave little role for government, the argument advanced here endorses the
suggestion that common law property rules provide the desirable framework for
conceptualizing Internet regulation. 2° 2 That is, we should be talking about
entitlements and obligations. We should be discussing borders and the best
means to monitor them. 203 In doing so, however, it is insufficient to suppose that
198. See Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 340-45
(1996) (discussing power spreading argument). Many of what Rose identifies as "keystone" rights are
considered, albeit with different terminology and much more cursorily, in Grey, supra note 9, at 73-79.
199. See Rose, supra note 198, at 365 (counting seven main property narratives); see also Michael
A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1183 (1999) (exploring three

distinct metaphorical property concepts and legal traditions they reflect); Singer, supra note 40, at
1462-65 (examining multiple property models).
200. See supra note 162 for a discussion of the regulations affecting government websites
accessible by the disabled.
201. See Gibbons, supra note 17, at 495, 509 (discussing criticisms of self-governance of cyberspace); id. at 482 n.35 (noting equal accommodation issues with Internet access and all-male or allfemale listserves).
202. See, e.g., Hardy, supra note 12, at 252-53 (analyzing common law property doctrines as
applicable to cyber-space).
203. See, e.g., Warner, supra note 61, at 120 (finding so long as special features of e-commerce
technologies are recognized, it is appropriate to apply doctrine of trespass to chattels in cyberspace).
Courts have sanctioned the use of trespass to chattels in the Internet context. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v.
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everyone with a vital stake in the future of the Internet should be left, like Maine
lobster gangs 20 4 or groundwater users in southern California, 2 5 to decide
amongst themselves how to manage our new information resources. The
application of successful common pool resource ("CPR") self-governance
models is problematic for purposes of the information resources available in
cyberspace because "ownership privileges" are not "restricted to a closed,
relatively homogeneous group. '20 6 Indeed, it is precisely because there are so
many "'theres' there" in cyberspace that something more is required.
Cyber-scholars advocating a revived "commons" on the Internet 2°7 tend to
overlook another central difference between the commons of Garrett Hardin's
village pasture grazed by the local cows 20 8 and cyberspace, namely the unlimited
quality of the potential space. The pasture cannot create more space; once the
grass is eaten, the same land can regenerate more grass, not more land. By
contrast, this is not true of cyberspace, where both the consumer resources
(goods and services) and the spatial medium in which they are distributed are
potentially infinite (limited only, of course, by the resources available to provide
hardware or the intelligence available to design protocols.) This suggests that it
may be unproductive to try to seek a balance between public and private
interests in cyberspace by means of a commons analysis.
It would be rash, however, to learn no lessons whatsoever from analysts of
common resource management issues, and particularly from Elinor Ostrom and
those who apply her work on natural resource CPRs. In examining successful
self-governance of groundwater supplies in several Los Angeles-area water
basins, Ostrom observes that "the rules for engaging in microinstitutional choice
related to the control of groundwater have encouraged investments in selforganization and the supply of local institutions."' 20 9 She goes on to caution that
"[a] similar set of individuals facing similar problems in an entirely different type
of political regime might not be able to supply themselves with transformed
microinstitutions" 210-the
"transformed
microinstitutions"
referring to
Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069-70 (N.D. Ca. 2000) (deciding trespass cause of action
existed for electronic signal sent to retrieve information from computer system); Thrifty-Tel v.
Bezenek, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1565-66 (1996) (employing computer technology to attain telephone
long-distance carrier's access codes from database constitutes trespass). Trespass is, of course, a
doctrine used to exclude when another intentionally interferes with one's possession. The right of
access permitted by public accommodation laws are, therefore, an exception to that doctrine.
Nonetheless, these cases ultimately reinforce the argument here, since trespass is about preventing
unauthorized access. Public accommodation law is, at least in part, about setting the terms of access.
204. See generally JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988) (exploring
common management practices in Maine fishing communities).
205. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR

COLLECTIVE ACTION 104-39 (1990).
206. Cohen, supra note 47, at 500 (criticizing use of Ostrom's work on self-governing natural
resource CPRs to analyze cyberspace governance).
207. See LESSIG, supra note 10, at 228-229 for a discussion of commons.
208. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1244 (1968).
209. Ostrom, supra note 205, at 139.
210. Id.
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successful self-governance structures. Importantly for purposes of the argument
advanced here, Ostrom concludes her review of the CPR success stories with a
discussion of the role of central government institutions: "[T]he difference
between an active effort by a central government to regulate appropriation and
provision activities and an effort to provide arenas and rules for
microinstitutional change is frequently blurred. 2 11 Much of the remainder of
Ostrom's analysis is devoted to the question
of how best to provide "arenas and
21 2
rules" for "microinstitutional change."
If the various "theres" in cyberspace are conceived of as
"microinstitutions," Ostrom's analysis provides insight into the questions
explored in this article. Even if one takes the view that some minimal
government regulation of the Internet is appropriate, it remains essential to
"provide arenas and rules for microinstitutional change." And, as always when
resources are at stake (here information rather than natural resources, of
course), it is essential to consider the appropriate public role regarding what has
rapidly emerged as a major-or perhaps many major-social and economic
institution(s). In short, this is to argue that, when applied to the Internet, public
accommodation principles can help define the "arenas and rules" for Internet
use, including all aspects of control and access, while also permitting continued
deliberations as to who-private or public parties or a mixture of the two-shall,
to use Ostrom's vocabulary, "regulate appropriation and provision activities" on
the Internet.
2. Cyberspace and a Multi-Faceted Property Concept
By contrast to "the narrower vision of property" that prevailed for much of
the last century and, in some circles, continues to enjoy enthusiastic support
today, 213 a vigorous property scholarship has emerged since Grey's famous
article about the "disintegration" of property, an article that will soon mark its
25th anniversary in print. That scholarship recognizes "property" as a multifaceted, nuanced notion, one not strictly confined to a calculus that says
"property" refers to the Blackstonian notion of "sole and despotic dominion." 21 4
Applied to the focus of this article, this post-Grey property scholarship
provides useful guidance for considering questions of control and access in
cyberspace. Michael Heller, for instance, has advanced the case that, while
optimal resource exploitation is a central goal of property institutions, there are
other, social ends served by property as well. In particular, Heller has warned
against the development of an "anti-commons" because property rights are re-

211. Id.
212. Id.
213. I refer specifically here to advocates of the "property rights" movement. A look at the
website of, for example, the Washington Legal Foundation gives a flavor of the ideas associated with
this movement. http://www.wlf.org/resources/wlfmission (last visited Sept. 6, 2003).
214. See Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601,

602-04 (1998) (arguing successfully that Blackstone's famous epigram may have been taken wildly out
of context).
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allocated or created anew. "One path to well-functioning private property" in a
manner that is both efficient and fair, he suggests, "is to convey a core bundle of
rights to a single owner, rather than rights of exclusion to multiple owners. '215 In
the context of the governance of cyberspace, for example, this suggests that
rather than underutilize cyberspace by allowing widespread individual exclusion,
the Internet will be sustained as a commercially vibrant collection of spaces that
serves a robust democratic ideal if, prior to allocation, rights to it are "bundled"
in such a way that insures the absolute right to exclude is neither a core right nor
separately held from other rights.
Heller has further argued for a departure from the triadic conception of
property that limits property talk to questions of private, state, or common
ownership. This taxonomy is unsatisfactory "[b]ecause people are constantly
creating new types of property," and he therefore suggests "that there remains
substantial room for analytic innovation in property scholarship, innovation
which, in turn, will carry normative punch when it redirects jurisprudential and
216
practical debates to new questions."
The particular innovations Heller offers up in service of his analytical
redesign of the standard property taxonomy are what he calls the "constructive"
and "integrative" approaches. 217 These are different sides of the same coin. The
constructive approach aims to work outside the standard triadic conception of
property, while the integrative seeks to work within it, drawing explanatory
power from useful aspects of each category. A type produced by the
constructive approach is, for instance, the "anti-commons," a notion conceived in
light of but analytically distinct from existing categories. The integrative
approach, by contrast, seeks to combine different analytical strands from existing
notions of property. For instance, by recognizing the intertwined aspects of
private and commons ownership in some types of property, and, in so doing,
rejecting "the oppositions between private and commons property," Heller's
analysis delineates what he and a colleague label the "liberal commons:"
[a]n analytic tool [that] can be deployed wherever people want to work
together but are prevented from doing so by background property
rules premised on the old-fashioned Blackstonian image of private
property and the unreflective hostility to cooperation built into the
tragedy of the commons image. By showing how a liberal commons can
integrate the benefits of private and commons forms, this dynamic
approach to property analytics advances normative and practical
215. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transitionfrom Marx
to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 688 (1998) (discussing Heller's "tragedy of the anti-commons" as
redefining the theory, showing how when few persons have the right to exclude, the best use of others
can be blocked). See also Hunter, supra note 1, at 89-93 (expressing Hunter's worry about
development of anti-commons in cyberspace).
216. Michael A. Heller, Contracts and Property Law: The Dynamic Analytics of Property Law, 2

THEORETICAL L. 79, 82 (2001). See also Michael A. Heller, Three Faces of Private Property, 79 OR. L.
REV. 417, 417-18 (2000) (discussing three types of property as outdated and overly simplistic, and
suggesting new way of analyzing property rights).
217. See Heller, Contracts, supra note 216, at 82-91 (offering these approaches as alternative to
traditional approaches to ownership forms).
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property projects.
The constructive approach, with its identification of a new category within the
property taxonomy, namely the "anti-commons," might provide insight as to
bundling of rights in cyberspace, including a rejection of widespread rights to
exclude. The constructive approach could be further useful to the regulation of
cyberspace. For example, it helps identify the fact that the private ownership of
Internet resources need not mean exclusive control. Instead, the constructive
approach suggests, guarantees of public access to private cyber-resources may
not only be appropriate but consistent with some property law traditions.
The "integrative" approach arguably provides even more useful insights in
order to insure Internet access. 219
Specifically, as regards cyberspace
governance, the integrative approach could be used to outline a workable model
for control of cyberspace by multiple claimants. As noted, the use of a commons
analysis is largely inapplicable to regulation of cyber-property by virtue of the
vast and far from homogeneous character of cyberspace. 220 Nonetheless, the
"liberal commons" constitutes a descriptive tool that helps explain practical and
normative realities in much property management, and specifically the
coordination of common and exclusively private interests-as for example in the
residential group ownership context. 221 The question then becomes whether this
notion has any analytical usefulness for the regulation of property in electronic
space.
Because of the vastness of cyberspace, an elaboration of Heller's notion of
the liberal commons, namely a liberal commons mediated by state oversight,
could prove useful. In this model, the state would play a familiar role: setting
ground rules and terms of engagement for the players, who then would be left to
allocate ownership interests among themselves, deciding for example, what
resources (code for communicating between computer systems, for example)
should be left to control by collective interests and what parts of the resource
should remain under wholly private control (web page information, for
instance). Thus, the state role need not be as intrusive as Lessig and others
worry.
Conversely, by application of principles like the law of public
accommodation, the state role would help ensure that no one is excluded entirely

218. Id. at 90. See also Hanoch Dagan and Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE
L.J. 549,553 (2001) (advocating liberal commons).
219. Although his use of the term "integrative" is new (at least to me), as an analytical construct
the notion advances the work of earlier scholars such as Carol Rose and Laura Underkuffler-Freund.
See Rose, supra note 198 and infra notes 230-34 for an exploration of constitutional property rights as
a source of political and economic power, and suggesting that the real allure of property rights is
economic, not constitutional. See, e.g., Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Property: A Special Right, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033, 1034 (1996) (disagreeing in part with Rose, supra note 198 and arguing
that property is both more complex and more contingent than other constitutionally-protected rights).
220. See Cohen, supra note 47, at 500 (noting heterogeneity will not lead to efficient allocation of
property rights).
221. See Heller, Three Faces, supra note 216, at 429 (discussing how values particular to a "liberal
commons" setting can point toward reform of property rights).
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222
and, as a result, excessive private control of the resource that is cyberspace
would be significantly reduced. A concern here-and one beyond the scope of
this paper-is that the collective not be captured by potentially monopolistic
interests-Microsoft, Intel, Netscape, and Cisco, to cite four prominent
examples. In short, to achieve Heller's aim, the liberal commons in this instance
would need to strike a balance between all possible claimants to participation
that did not hand over effective control to the major players.
The question is how to clarify the nature of rights both public and private in
cyberspace. As with other aspects of intellectual property law and in the
environmental regulatory context, "the Internet... appears to call for some
balance of property and commons" in the way that it is legally administered and
regulated. 223 Although achieving such a balance is fraught with difficulty, notably
the effects of "partial propertization" and the resulting inefficiencies caused by
over- or under-allocation of property rights, 224 to say nothing of enforcement or
litigation costs,2 25 agreement is nonetheless needed to find some role for
simultaneous management of both commons and private property. This could
be overseen by public authorities, by means of property law principles designed
to protect common, public interests-principles like the law of public
accommodation.
Property rules are by nature disruptive 226 and multi-featured. 227 As with
real property, the forms of disruptions that would be most troublesome are
"regulatory adjustments," a "category [that] includes instances in which property
is affected by regulatory changes-changes that in some measure alter the scope
and content of property rights. '22 8 Particularly troublesome is what Carol Rose
calls "the Utilitarian Dilemma, a dilemma that underlies many of the claims that
property has been unconstitutionally taken. The dilemma is that the essential
goal of securing property expectations clashes with the equally essential goal of
managing congested resources." 229 Without repeating the intricacies of her
analysis, suffice it to say that recognizing this dilemma underscores the potential
appropriateness of applying public accommodation principles to cyberspace
regulation. That is, public accommodation law denies only the right to exclude
absolutely and, thus, defines and therefore secures the property to which it is

222. See Lemley, supra note 47, at 1293 (arguing for public, rather than private control of
internet); Netanel, supra note 73, at 452 (discussing desire for freedom on Internet and potential areas
where legislation appropriate).
223. Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission
Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 155 (1998).

224. See id. at 152-153 (discussing conflicts that arise from partial propertization).
225. See id. at 154 (discussing costs of enforcement and litigation arising from partial
propertization).
226. See Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation:Themes and Variations in American Law,

2000 UTAH L. REV. 1, 6 (2000) (commenting on ways law can be used to disrupt property rights).
227. See Rose, supra note 198. at 330-31 (discussing expectations that property will do more than
secure economic prosperity).
228. Rose, supra note 226, at 15.
229. Id. at 19.
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applied. Moreover, in the cyberspace context, public accommodation law in this
way may play a management role, since it may be used to help identify bedrock
principles for the use of congested cyberspace.
Similarly, Rose's classification of multiple justifications for property stands
as a useful typology for beginning to understand the varied and competing
interests at stake in cyberspace. The "priority argument" she notes, namely the
notion that "[p]roperty is the key to all other rights because it is prior to politics,
and hence the basis upon which all other civil rights rest, ' 230 may shed light on
the way we seem to think about cyberspace. That is, as noted at the outset of
this article, cyber-observers, even prior to the extensive regulation of the
Internet, appeared to favor the property metaphor to describe cyberspace. This
suggests a sense that whatever is "there" in cyberspace merits classification-and
protection-as property.
Furthermore, other arguments identified in her typology, including the
"power-spreading," 231 "independence, 2 32 and "luxury-good ' 233 arguments, shed
light on the appropriateness of conceptualizing cyberspace as regulable property,
provided that such regulation is not understood as securing purely private rights
to the exclusion of all other concerns. The power-spreading argument is
associated with free market economics and the belief that the right of individuals
to hold property acts as a bulwark against intrusive, monopolistic political
regulation. 234 Individual property holding, however, also tends in time to lead to
235
economic concentrations of power.
Once again, a way to insure power-spreading through property entitlements
is by means of rules that mediate among different interests-and in particular
between those of private parties, those with limited group rights, and those of the
public generally. And, once again, public accommodation law is one notable
example of a legal principle that works precisely to strike a balance between
those competing interests.
The same can be said of the "independence" argument, namely the belief
that "property makes individuals independent and thus capable of selfAs with power-spreading, individuals cannot gain
government. ' 236
independence without access to property. And public accommodation law is one

230. Rose, supra note 198, at 333.
231. See id. at 340 (stating proposition that property diffuses power because holding property
grants power to holder).
232. See id. at 345 (asserting that property allows people to be independent, making
unencumbered political judgments).
233. See id. at 358 (finding that property protects other rights by making society wealthier).
234. See id. at 340-41 (discussing property as alternative to political power limiting suppression of
other rights).
235. Rose, supra note 198, at 343-44. These concentrations, paradoxically, are not unlike in kind
the political concentrations of power private property regimes were supposed to prevent in the first
place. Thus, she concludes her analysis of the power-spreading argument with the acknowledgment
that "[t]otally diffuse power is not really compatible with property at all; property can do little to help
safeguard other rights in a regime where the governing principle is dog-eat-dog." Id. at 345.
236. Id.
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such means to permit the possibility of accessing and, thus, potentially acquiring
property. In the simplest terms, this is to say not that one must "pay to play" but
rather that one can't pay if one doesn't know how to get inside and pay, or what
one can pay for.
So too for the "luxury-goods" argument, the idea that "[p]roperty protects
all other rights precisely by fulfilling its economic function, and by making a
society wealthier. '237 In the context of the argument advanced in this article, this
is to say, as with the independence argument, that maximum wealth creation is
not possible without the maximum opportunity for wealth creation. Thus, a nondiscriminatory right of access is an essential attribute of any property regime in
cyberspace. In sum, contemporary property scholarship advances a way of
approaching public accommodation law that is strikingly similar to antebellum
approaches. That is, the emphasis of contemporary scholarship on the varied
and multi-textured quality of what we classify under the "property" label focuses
attention on the need for an expansive understanding of public accommodation.
Specifically, contemporary scholarship reinforces the notion that the focus
should not be on rigid doctrinal categories (e.g. common carriers and
innkeepers) but, instead, on the nature of an enterprise. Thus, if an entity holds
itself out to do business with the public-in cyberspace as in real space-it
should be required to accommodate the public.
How extensive that
accommodation and the associated right of electronic access should be are
matters for legislative determination. At a minimum, this article has endeavored
to suggest, they should guarantee access to all classes of persons currently
protected by public accommodation laws.
B. Why Public Accommodation
The argument advanced here risks, I know, making me something of a
Johnny One Note. 238 And I certainly do not mean to suggest that public
accommodation law is a be-all and end-all, the panacea for mediating between
the competing interests claiming ownership of and the right to participate in
cyberspace. What the article does aim to suggest, however, is that public
accommodation is a potentially powerful tool that, if used judiciously in the
regulation of cyberspace, will serve goals of both robust democracy and strong
economic growth.
To that end, I have suggested a limited state role in the regulation of
cyberspace by means of the law of public accommodation. This is to say that in
the context of cyberspace regulation the application of public accommodation
principles could be used as a bulwark against the concentration of control over
information and the concomitant economic power that it represents, in keeping

237. Id. at 358.
238. "Johnny could only sing one note/ And the note he sings was this/ Ah!/ Poor Johnny onenote/sang out with "gusto'/And just overlorded the place/Poor Johnny one-note/ yelled willy
nilly/Until he was bleu in the face/ For holding one note was his ace." LORENZ HART AND RICHARD
ROGERS, JOHNNY ONE NOTE, (Chappell Music, 1936).
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with our richest democratic traditions. 23 9 As a result, such principles can, in the
context of new technologies, inculcate virtues like transparency at a formal, legal
level. Thus, public accommodation principles as applied to cyberspace can help
maintain a threshold level of access for all persons so that the Internet continues
to feed democracy rather than to promote parochialism.
Simultaneously, however, given blocking technologies now available for use
on the Internet, 4° it will be possible to apply public accommodation principles
without simultaneously compelling release of proprietary information. The
point here is to use property law to assert a right of access and thus, for example,
to minimize dangers like those posed by the "vertical integration" of the
Internet.

241

As intimated earlier, moreover, this would be in keeping with the original
purpose of public accommodations laws and their historical antecedents, which
was to insure access if the nature of the service was to perform a social role
directed at the public. 242 It is appropriate to apply public accommodation law to
the Internet context, furthermore, by virtue of our use of the property metaphor
That is, if one takes words seriously, and
to describe cyber-institutions.
understands that the diction and metaphor adopted to describe the Internet are
not merely matters of descriptive convenience but instead reveal something
fundamental about the way we understand the medium, 243 property law is the
clear default source for governance as it relates to cyberspace.

239. See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 73, at 461-65 (discussing regulation of mass media to create
pluralism of voice); cf Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND L. REV.
1607, 1612-16 (1999) (discussing desire for freedom on Internet and use of legislation to regulate it;
reviewing author who states individual liberty is paramount and is skeptical about government
regulation).

See also SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF

OWNERSHIP 40 (2000) (asserting wider ownership of property is value deeply embedded in our
constitutional tradition). An observation of Singer's underlines the point I am making here:
The law of property-the law governing the marketplace-depends on moral choices about
the just contours of social life. Our views about minimum standards of decency and the
requisites of an economic system compatible with human dignity are crucially influenced by
the sources of our ultimate values and beliefs. The framers of the Constitution wanted to
grant great protection for property, but they also wanted a nation with widespread
ownership of property.
Id. at 40 (citation omitted).
240. I refer to what are often known as "filtering technologies." See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 73,
at 467-68 (discussing potential use of software to filter out Internet content the viewer does not want
to see); see also Lisa Guernsey, Welcome to the Web: PassportPlease? Information May Want to be
Free, but Courts and New Software Could Impose National Borders, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2001, at D1
(discussing use of filtering software as means of limiting access to Internet materials based on laws of
certain countries).
241. LESSIG, supra note 10, at 165-66 (quoting, inter alia, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
INTERNET'S COMING OF AGE (National Academy Press 2000)).

242. Singer, supra note 40, at 1308-15 (discussing laws requiring innkeepers and common carriers
to hold businesses open to public).
243. See, e.g., Susan W. Tiefenbrun, Legal Semiotics, 5 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 89, 116
(1986) (overviewing ideas of celebrated semiotician Ferdinand De Saussure and noting "Saussure
continually stressed the importance of seeing language as a system of socially determined values.").
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This is to endorse a view of Internet property then, as essentially no
different in terms of regulatory demands from chattel or realty, and to endorse
the claim that any such property constitutes part of a social institution that is
designed to assure sociability and well-functioning community as much as to
assure individual security and economic power.2"
Moreover, as noted
previously, this view also recognizes that while these ends sometimes conflict,
245
they are not mutually exclusive.
V.

CONCLUSION

Current and future regulation of cyberspace must proceed on several fronts.
Regulators must deal not only with the Internet's physical layer, but also with its
less concrete manifestations, namely the code and content layers. I have argued
that this is not only possible, but essential. In particular, the argument put forth
here has endorsed the view that property institutions, conceived in the widest
sense, are the appropriate means to regulate cyberspace-as opposed to, for
instance, ordering of cyberspace by private contract rules alone. Specifically, this
article has endeavored to show that at every layer-physical, code and contentcyberspace can and should be regulated like physical space. If cyberspace is to
serve both social and democratic ends as well as commercial ones, this includes,
importantly, the regulation of cyber-spaces as places of public accommodation.
It has been my further contention here that this notion corresponds with our
metaphorical and descriptive vocabulary for the Internet, and the belief that this
language need be taken seriously as a guide for the direction of present and
future regulation. Thus, in future regulation of cyberspace it is my suggestion
that we need not only apply principles of public accommodation to Internet
regulation, but also draw from the full arsenal of property law doctrines and
concepts.
This process will not always be either simple or uncontentious. As noted
earlier, for instance, the widening of the "digital divide" 246 may demand
reconsideration and further expansion of both the categories and types of status
today deemed worthy of designated public accommodation protection. Without
question, a possible prohibition on exclusion based on professional or economic
status would lead to an especially lively, and perhaps even rancorous debate.
Yet as the "holding out" justifications for the antebellum right of access
indicates, 247 there are both historical and theoretical legal reasons to believe that
244. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public

Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 723 (1986) (discussing use of public property for commerce as way of
expanding wealth and increase sociability).
245. See Rose, supra note 198, at 363 (discussing fragility of property rights but long-term
stability based on increase in cooperation and wealth).
246. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of why these problems are not
new features of the information age. See also Vincent Mosco, Introduction to POLITICAL ECONOMY

OF INFORMATION 11 (Vincent Mosco & Janet Waco eds., 1988) (worrying, for example, that "[t]oday
you can add to the familiar "Why Johnny can't read?" the increasingly familiar "Why can't Johnny
and Jane afford a dial tone?").
247. Singer, supra note 40, at 1318-24 (citing duty of innkeepers and common carriers to serve

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

such a debate is worth having. And while such a discussion might prove difficult
and protracted, the historical struggle over the contours of what exactly
constitutes a place of public accommodation affirms that the discussion is
essential if all property-in cyberspace as well as on the ground-is to be widely
accessible, not controlled by a few individuals and entities.

public stems from fact that they hold themselves out as ready to do so). See also sup,-a notes 101-17
and accompanying text for a discussion of public accommodation law.

